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Summary 
This thesis sets out to discuss how the gravity model is used to account 
for the presence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in world trade, and how 
different applications have consequences for policy analysis. This is 
discussed through the models use in in two independent studies trying 
to predict the effects of a trade integration agreement between the EU 
and US. I also run my own gravity regression using a unique dataset to 
further supplement the discussion.  
NTBs are complex measures which impact trade in other ways than 
standard ad-valorem tariffs. They can be argued to correct market 
failures (e.g. as sanitary measures or safety regulations), or function as 
protectionist tools (i.e. as substitutes and/or compliments for tariffs). 
Furthermore, NTBs are difficult to monitor and measure, much more so 
than tariffs. Therefore, NTBs pose a serious challenge for economic 
research, especially since it is a general consensus that the presence of 
NTBs has become more apparent in recent decades, as shown by e.g. 
World Bank (2012). 
I investigate how the gravity model of trade, the most common tool 
for estimating trade flows, is used to account for the presence of NTBs. 
In particular, I look at how the model is used differently in two 
comprehensive studies that both try to predict the effects of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership (TTIP) – a trade 
agreement between the EU and US currently under negotiation. NTB 
reduction is an explicit goal of the agreement, which makes this an 
important part of both studies.  
The studies are performed by the Leibniz Institute for Economic 
Research (IFO) and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). 
They reach very different conclusions on the effects of TTIP, both 
regarding the magnitude of the effects and sometimes also the direction 
of the outcome. I find that they use the gravity equation in different 
ways in the two studies, and argue that this is one of the reasons for 
their divergent results. 
To further discuss the presence of NTBs, and to provide an 
alternative to the CEPR and IFO studies, I construct an independent 
dataset. I use data on tariffs, NTBs and regional trade agreements 
(RTAs), and run my own regressions based on a thorough discussion on 
both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the gravity model. My data 
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confirms that NTBs are more important than tariffs (on average) and my 
regressions show that there are gains to be made from reducing both 
NTBs and tariffs, but that the success of TTIP, or any trade agreement 
for that matter, to a large extent will hinge on NTB reductions. In this 
respect my data confirm similar observations in both the CEPR and IFO 
study. The results also imply that the effects of trade agreements seem 
somewhat underestimated in the CEPR study. Furthermore, my results 
indicate that the method used by IFO is highly sensitive to which trade 
agreements’ that are included in their RTA dummy variable, as their 
method consists of simulating a TTIP scenario based on the average 
effect of existing trade agreements.  
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Introduction 
During the last few decades the world economy has become 
increasingly integrated, and an important aspect of so-called 
“Globalization” has been to successfully reduce economic frictions 
between nations. In spite of this there are few countries, industries or 
even products where free trade truly exists, and as tariff levels have 
decreased, a new challenge has emerged. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are 
complex measures which impact trade in other ways than standard ad-
valorem1 tariffs. Ranging from technical regulations and sanitary 
measures to import quotas and border inspections, they can correct 
market failures or serve as tools of protectionism. According to the 
World Bank (2012), NTBs have been increasing in recent years, both in 
magnitude and multitude, and it is often argued that they serve as 
substitutes for tariffs (e.g. by Kee et al, 2009). Therefore, for anyone 
trying to remove trade frictions between nations, NTBs are a serious 
challenge. Furthermore, they pose a challenge to everyone wanting to 
measure and quantify them.  
Unlike tariffs, NTBs are not easily observed and there is no universal 
consensus on how they should be accounted for in empirical research. 
A tool which is frequently used is the gravity model of trade. If data is 
available the model can be used to estimate the effect of NTBs on trade 
flows, but it can also be used to transform data (e.g. from surveys) into 
ad-valorem tariff equivalents (as in e.g. Kee et al, 2009 and ECORYS, 
2009a). 
I this thesis I discuss the use of gravity and how it is used in economic 
research to account for NTBs in an applied setting. In particular, I look 
at the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) – a trade integration agreement between the EU and US 
currently under negotiation. To reduce NTBs as well as tariffs is an 
explicit goal of the agreement (it is even pronounced on the TTIP 
homepage2). However, in spite of political will to get the agreement up 
and running on both sides of the Atlantic, NTB reduction is a 
complicated and sometimes delicate task. There is no guarantee of 
successful NTB removal. Therefore, there have been numerous studies 
                                                             
1  Ad-valorem is Latin for “according to the value”. Thus, tariffs are ad-valorem in the 
sense that they are proportional, i.e. an X % ad-valorem import tariff amounts to X 
% of the import value. 
2  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/ 
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trying to predict the results which look at various depths of the 
agreements’ ability to reduce frictions. In particular, there have been 
two major studies that have influenced the debate; one by the Leibniz 
Institute for Economic Research (IFO), the other by the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Their results are generally positive; 
TTIP will increase trade, GDP and welfare (IFO, 2013a; CEPR, 2013). 
But the studies vary tremendously in terms of both the magnitude of 
the impact, and sometimes also regarding the direction of the outcome. 
However, in both studies the gravity equation plays a pivotal role. In 
particular, both use the gravity model, in different ways, to incorporate 
the presence of NTBs into their models. Their different ways of using 
the gravity model can help to explain their divergent results. This 
makes the two studies the perfect backdrop for a discussion on how the 
gravity model can be used to account for the presence of NTBs, and 
how different ways of using the model have consequences for policy 
analysis. 
In its most simple form the gravity equation relates a country j's 
expenditure on goods from country i, i.e. i’s exports to j, to the 
countries sizes, often measured by GDP, and any trade frictions 
between them. This relation has proved to be one of the most 
empirically successful in economic literature, but until recently it has 
lacked a proper theoretical footing (Head and Mayer, 2014). One of the 
first successful attempts to derive a theoretical version of the model 
was Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The most important result 
emerging from their work is one that is intuitively appealing, but 
previously not formalized into the model; “… the more resistant to trade 
with all others a region is, the more it is pushed to trade with a given 
bilateral partner” (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 pp. 170). In other 
words, trade frictions with all trade partners of both i and j affect their 
bilateral trade. Previous empirical versions of the gravity equation have 
failed to control for this, and have thus suffered from an omitted 
variable bias (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Anderson and van 
Wincoop named this concept “multilateral resistance” and nearly every 
theoretical gravity model since have integrated this concept one way or 
another (e.g. Bergstrand et al, 2013). Now, the model has a range of 
different theoretical microfoundations and has been shown to be very 
flexible to a wide range of specifications; e.g. the convergence with the 
heterogeneous firms literature (by Chaney (2008); Helpman et al. 
(2008); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). There have also been substantial 
developments regarding the econometric version of the model; with the 
use of fixed effects estimation (suggested by e.g. Feenstra, 2004), and 
the introduction of PPML estimation by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This 
has made the gravity model the obvious choice for determining the 
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impact of any variable on trade flows, which makes it a natural 
framework for measuring the effects of NTBs on trade.  
The increased relevance of and focus on NTBs by policymakers and 
researchers, along with the recent developments of the gravity model 
and its use as a tool to predict the effects of TTIP motivates the 
following objective for my thesis: 
Investigate how the gravity model is used to account for the presence of 
NTBs in economic research, and in particular how it has been used to 
predict the outcome of TTIP. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the 
gravity model. The purpose is to establish a firm understanding of the 
model before going into a discussion about how it is used to account for 
the presence of NTBs. In chapter 3, I discuss the two studies on TTIP. I 
present their main results to demonstrate the divergence between 
them, before going into depth on their use of gravity and how they use 
the model to estimate the impact of NTBs. Chapter 4 contains my own 
estimations of the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model. I use a 
comprehensive dataset on NTBs from the World Bank (constructed by 
Kee et al, 2009), which provides additional insight to the size of 
transatlantic as well as worldwide NTBs. Furthermore, my regressions 
provide an alternative to both the CEPR and the IFO studies and 
demonstrate the sensitivity of their methods. In addition to data on 
NTBs, I use data on existing trade agreements and discuss their ex-post 
effects on trade flows for both members and non-members of these 
agreements. Chapter 5 concludes. 
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The gravity equation of trade 
In this chapter I introduce the gravity model. The purpose is to formally 
introduce and discuss the model which is commonly used to measure 
the effects of NTBs on trade flows. I start with a brief discussion of the 
evolution of the model which has gone through a substantial 
evolvement over the last decades. However, it is not my intent to 
present every aspect of its evolution; I present a selective survey where 
I focus on what is most relevant for my thesis, namely the tools needed 
to discuss the effects of NTBs. In this regard, the introduction of so-
called multilateral resistance by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is 
important.  
First, I introduce a general version of the gravity model which is useful 
for capturing the modern concept of gravity in trade, before deriving 
the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity model in its entirety. 
Their model is a crucial element in both studies on the TTIP agreement 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. I also include a brief 
discussion on the limitations of the model and the assumptions it 
makes. Next, I discuss some of the most common estimation techniques 
used in the literature. The discussion is limited to what is relevant for 
the estimations in chapter 4.  
The evolution of gravity in trade 
The gravity model of bilateral trade flows first made its appearance in 
the economic literature in the 1960s. It is the Dutch economist Jan 
Tinbergen (1962) who is given credit for bringing the Newtonian law of 
universal gravitation from the late 1600s into the gravity literature (e.g. 
by Head and Mayer, 2014 and Feenstra, 2004). The Newtonian law of 
gravity stipulates that the gravitational force between two objects is 
proportional to the product of the two objects mass and inversely 
proportional to their distance. Analogous to this, the first gravity 
equation of international trade stipulated that trade between two 
countries is proportional to the product of the countries size and 
inversely proportional to the distance between them. Let 𝑋𝑖𝑗  be 
bilateral trade (exports or imports), 𝑌𝑖  and 𝑌𝑗  denote the country size 
(often measured by GDP), 𝜙𝑖𝑗  represent bilateral distance, and  𝐺 be a 
constant: 
Non-tariff barriers, trade integration and the gravity model 13 
2.1 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐺𝑌𝑖
𝑎𝑌𝑗
𝑏𝜙𝑖𝑗
−𝑐   
Equation (2.1) is the original gravity equation used by Tinbergen 
(1962). In light of the recent advancements within gravity research it is 
named the “Naïve” gravity equation by Head and Mayer (2014). 3  The 
generalization that 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏 ≠ 𝑐 ≠ 1 is a feature added to the original 
Newtonian law of gravity which assumes that the coefficients equal 
unity. However, many studies have suggested that this might be the 
case for economic gravity as well. In a meta-analysis, Head and Mayer 
(2014) find that average estimates are 𝑎 = 0.98, = 0.84 , 𝑐 = 0.93, 
and that the unity coefficient often is included in the confidence 
intervals. 4 However, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue the “unity-
consensus” is based upon a bias resulting from the use of OLS 
estimation with heteroskedastic data. This will be discussed in detail 
below. 
While the gravity equation of Tinbergen has been used by economists 
since the 1960s and was proved to be of high empirical relevance, it 
received opposition from the research community and stayed outside 
the mainstream of trade research until 1995 (Head and Mayer, 2014). 
One of the reasons for this was the perception that the gravity equation 
was more an analogy of physics than a product of economic theory, 
despite an elaborate attempt by Anderson (1979) to provide a sound 
theoretical foundation. His model was deemed too complex, and did 
not catch on (Head and Mayer, 2014). But, while Anderson’s model did 
not push gravity into the limelight, it laid the groundwork for the 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model which revolutionized the 
field.  
Head and Mayer (2014) divide the success of gravity, and its 
acceptance into the mainstream research community, into three stages, 
which will be elaborated in the three following subsections. 
Admission 
The turnaround came in 1995, when the conventional trade theories 
were the subject of discussion. Trefler (1995) criticized the standing 
literature’s empirical relevance, and in particular he claimed that the 
Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) theorem performs horribly. The H-O theorem 
states that a country will export the good which uses its relatively most 
                                                             
3  I have added the coefficient −𝑐 to the last term of the naïve gravity equation as it is 
written in Head and Mayer (2014, eq. 4). This is to underline the point that since it 
is assumed that distance is the only trade friction the coefficient is assumed to be 
negative. 
4  In 700, 671 and 1835 gravity studies respectively (Head and Mayer, 2014). 
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abundant factor of production intensively, and import the good which 
uses its relatively scarce production factor intensively. In other words, 
factor endowments determine the trade flows in the H-O model. Trefler 
states that; “[f]actor endowments correctly predicts the direction of 
factor service trade about 50 percent of the time, a success rate that is 
matched by a coin toss” (Trefler, 1995 pp. 1029). He argues further 
that when a major theory within a field performs this badly, it should 
serve as an incentive to develop new theories. Also in 1995, Leamer 
and Levinsohn argued that gravity models have an impressively high 
success rate regarding its ability to explain international trade flows. 
They go on to criticize economists for not admitting distance into their 
way of thinking (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995).  
Another important contribution was Krugman (1995) who introduced 
the concept of “remoteness”. This was one of the first steps on the way 
towards the concept of multilateral resistance, which was popularized 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Remoteness measures a 
country’s average distance from all its trading partners, weighted by 
the partner countries share of world GDP. The idea is that bilateral 
trade relations between countries i and j are influenced by both 
countries’ other bilateral trade relations. Krugman elegantly illustrates 
his point with a thought experiment where the trading countries i and j 
are moved from the heart of Europe to Mars. Intuitively, he argues, this 
would affect their trade patterns. In the context of Trefler’s call for a 
new major theory of trade, Krugman’s thought experiment can be 
understood as an argument for the need to include general equilibrium 
effects into this theory. 
Another highly influential paper was McCallum (1995). He used the 
gravity equation to measure the effect of national borders on trade. He 
concludes that both national borders and bilateral distance are 
significant frictions to trade. This came at a time when the business 
press was claiming the “death of distance” and the “borderless world” 
as world trade became more integrated (Head and Mayer, 2014). In 
light of this, McCallum’s result was named the “Border puzzle” and his 
paper was an important demonstration of the explanatory power of the 
gravity equation. 
Structural gravity – the “revolution” of multilateral resistance 
Trefler’s call for a new major theory to explain trade flows, Leamer and 
Levinsohn’s focus on the high empirical relevance of gravity, and 
Krugman’s call for including general equilibrium effects resulted in the 
gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The goal of their 
paper was twofold; to create a sound theoretical framework for the 
gravity model, and  use this to solve the McCallum border puzzle. My 
Non-tariff barriers, trade integration and the gravity model 15 
focus will be on the former. The Anderson and van Wincoop model 
stipulates that trade between i and j is a function of (i) bilateral trade 
frictions between i and j, (ii) trade frictions between i and all its trade 
partners, and (iii) trade frictions between j and all its trade partners 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Effects (ii) and (iii) are what they 
call “multilateral resistance”, which now has become a standard 
concept in gravity models. The surge of gravity models following 
Anderson and van Wincoop has become known as structural gravity 
equations.  
While Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) deserve to be credited for 
formalizing the concept of multilateral resistance, the concept precedes 
them. As mentioned above, Krugman’s thought experiment and his 
concept of remoteness reflects this. Furthermore, the necessity of 
controlling for multilateral effects is clearly stated by Polak (1996). He 
calls for including a term in the gravity equation which measures the 
“…total negative effect on the imports […] resulting from all the 
bilateral distances” (Polak, 1996 pp. 535). Controlling for this corrects 
an underestimation of trade flows in the gravity equation relative to 
observed values which was persistent in the literature, e.g. in Frankel 
et al. 1994a and 1994b (Polak, 1996). Polak states that the idea of 
including all bilateral distances is traced all the way back to 
Linnemann (1966). Linnemann created a ”location index” measuring 
each country’s average distance from its trading partners, as Krugman 
suggested, but he did not include this in his gravity equation.  
Convergence with the heterogeneous firms literature 
The gravity models’ final step towards inclusion in the field of inter-
national economics was the unification with the literature on 
heterogeneous production, i.e. where productivity is assumed to vary 
across firms (Head and Mayer, 2014). This concept was brought into 
the field of international economics by Melitz (2003). In 2008, three 
independent papers that expanded the gravity model in this direction 
were published; Chaney (2008), Helpman et al. (2008), and Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008). All these papers have in common that they allow for 
heterogeneous productivity on the supply side in the gravity model. 
Thus, these models were able to analyze the effects of trade shocks on 
the intensive and extensive production margins separately. As firm 
heterogeneity will not be a focal point of my thesis, I will not go far into 
this literature. 
The introduction of multilateral resistance and the subsequent 
expansion of gravity to include firm heterogeneity shows how the 
gravity model has gone from being an empirical relation without a 
proper theoretical foundation, which met little respect in the main-
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stream economic literature, to become a model truly respected by 
theorists. The model now has a range of different theoretical 
microfoundations, and has been shown to be flexible to a wide range of 
specifications. In the next section, I go deeper into the formalities of the 
Anderson and van Wincoop gravity equation.  
Microfoundations 
Since the “revolution” of multilateral resistance a wide variety of 
theoretical microfoundations for the gravity model has been 
introduced. While my estimations are based on the Anderson and van 
Wincoop model, it is useful to start off at a more general level to 
demonstrate the flexibility and robustness of the gravity model across a 
wide range of different microeconomic assumptions and specifications.  
The Basic definition  
A general version of the modern gravity model can be written as in 
Head and Mayer (2014): 
2.2 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑀𝑗𝜙𝑖𝑗  ,   𝜙𝑖𝑗 ∈ [0,1]  
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑗  is bilateral export from i to j5. 𝑆𝑖  represents all “capabilities” 
of the exporter to all destinations while 𝑀𝑗  captures all the 
characteristics of the import market in j. Note that the model is more 
general than the naïve version in the preceding subsection; 𝑌𝑖  and 𝑌𝑗  
have been replaced by  𝑆𝑖  and 𝑀𝑗, where all characteristics belonging 
to i and j are included. 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑀𝑗  are multilateral terms as they are 
equal across all importers (exporters) for a given exporter (importer). 
The term 𝜙𝑖𝑗  is now interpreted as bilateral accessibility of exporter i to 
importer j which now captures all concepts of friction in trade. This 
includes both natural frictions such as distance and geographical 
placement, and political frictions such as borders, tariffs and NTBs. The 
term 𝐺 is a gravitational constant. If time subscripts were added, i.e. if 
the above equation is used in a panel data analysis, 𝐺 would be 
allowed to vary over time.  
Two important features stand out from equation (2.2). First, note that 
each term enters multiplicatively. This particular functional form is 
consistent across all specifications of the gravity model. It is a feature 
which is rooted in the models historical analogy to the Newtonian law 
of gravity. In other words, the multiplicative form has occurred 
somewhat unintentionally and does not necessarily reflect any features 
of economic theory. Nevertheless, the functional form has some 
                                                             
5  In principle 𝑋𝑖𝑗  can also be bilateral imports.  
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theoretical justifications. In particular, Anderson (1979) demonstrates 
that a multiplicative form follows from a Cobb Douglas model where 
products are differentiated by place of origin, and Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) show that the multiplicative form could be generated 
in a model with intra-industry trade only. However, it is possible that 
future work will make use of other functional forms, as argued by Head 
and Mayer (2014).  
The second, and most important feature in (2.2) is the fact that all third 
country effects must come through the multilateral terms 𝑆𝑖  or 𝑀𝑗. To 
extrapolate this point, Head and Mayer expand the above definition of 
the gravity model: 
2.3 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑌𝑖
Ω𝑖𝑗⏟
𝑆𝑖
𝑋𝑗
Φ𝑗⏟
𝑀𝑗
𝜙𝑖𝑗  
 
Equation (2.3) is called the Structural Gravity Equation. Here, country 
i’s value of production, 𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗 , is defined as the sum of its exports 
to all regions, and the value of country j’s expenditure, 𝑋𝑗 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖 , is 
defined as the sum of its imports across all exporters. In practice GDP is 
often used as a proxy for  𝑌𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗. The terms Ω𝑖 and Φ𝑗 are the 
multilateral resistance terms which are defined as:  
2.4 Φ𝑗 = ∑
𝜙𝑗𝑙𝑌𝑙
Ω𝑙
𝑙   and Ω𝑖 = ∑
𝜙𝑙𝑖𝑋𝑙
Φ𝑙
𝑙  
  
The important feature of the multilateral resistance terms is that they 
include trade friction terms between all trading partners for both i and 
j. It is intuitively appealing that the friction between j and its other 
trading partners, i.e. all 𝑙 ≠ 𝑖, will affect its demand for goods from i. 
For example, if a bilateral trade agreement were initiated between 
importer j and some other country 𝑙 ≠ 𝑖, this would decrease trade 
costs between j and 𝑙 relative to those between j and i. Hence, country 
j’s demand would shift towards 𝑙 and away from i, and exports from 
country i to country j would decrease.  
The structural gravity model, as described in equation (2.3) and (2.4) 
above, identifies the core features of modern gravity theory. It relates 
bilateral exports multiplicatively to bilateral trade frictions, the 
exporter’s value of production, importer’s value of expenditures, and 
controls for multilateral resistance. However, beyond this the model in 
(2.3) and (2.4) is of little use. To obtain a gravity equation to be used 
for estimation, a more elaborate theoretical framework is needed. As 
mentioned above there are many possible approaches. Both conditio-
Marcus Gjems Theie 18 
nal- and unconditional general equilibrium frameworks can be used. In 
the next section, I derive the model based on the conditional general 
equilibrium framework from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Their 
model is relevant for discussing both the IFO and CEPR studies on the 
TTIP agreement as both use extensions of this model to account for 
NTBs and tariffs. I will also briefly present alternative specifications 
such as the unconditional general equilibrium approach, based on 
monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale in produc-
tion, as in Bergstrand et al (2013).  
The Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model 
Assumptions 
There are two main underlying assumptions in the Anderson and van 
Wincoop model. The first assumption is that goods are differentiated by 
place of origin. This is the so called Armington assumption, after 
Armington (1969), who assumed that two goods of the same kind 
originating from different regions were imperfect substitutes. The 
Armington assumption implies trade separability. This means that the 
allocation of trade across countries is separable from the allocation of 
production and spending within countries (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2004). This assumption ensures that the model is a 
conditional general equilibrium model where supply of and 
expenditure on goods can be taken as a given in the analysis of 
bilateral trade patterns (ECORYS, 2009b). A related assumption is that 
each country specializes in production of only one good and regards 
the supply of each good as fixed. Hence, their model does not include 
firm’s decisions. The second assumption is that consumers have 
identical and homothetic preferences6. This motivates the use of a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function (Anderson and 
van Wincoop, 2003).  
Deriving the gravity equation 
The CES utility function of consumers in country j is given by 
 
2.5 
𝑈𝑗 = [∑ 𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
∙ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
(𝜎−1)/𝜎
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
𝜎/(𝜎−1)
 
 
 
                                                             
6  I.e. described by a homothetic utility function, defined such that if the consumer is 
indifferent between 𝐴 and 𝐵 he is also indifferent between 𝑧𝐴and 𝑧𝐵 for any 𝑧 > 0. 
The CES utility function is homothetic.  
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Where 𝑐𝑖𝑗  is consumption of goods from i by consumers in j, 𝜎 is the 
elasticity of substitution and N is the number of countries. 𝛽𝑖  is an 
arbitrary parameter of preference towards goods from country i, which 
can be thought of as an inverse measure of quality. It might be more 
useful to consider 𝛽𝑖 = 1/𝛼𝑖, where 𝛼𝑖  can be thought of as the 
attractiveness of country i's good (Head and Mayer, 2014). This is more 
intuitively appealing and it would be a simple matter to replace  
𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
 with 𝛼𝑖
(𝜎−1)/𝜎
 in equation (2.5). However, I continue with the 
above specification as this is the one used by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003).  
The consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint:  
2.6 𝑌𝑗 =∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗  is the price on goods from i faced by consumers in j. Due 
to trade costs, the price of country i's goods differ depending on the 
importer j. Trade costs are modeled according to the “iceberg”-
structure where it is assumed that only a fraction 𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∈ (0,1) of shipped 
goods from i arrive in j, while the rest “melts” away during transpor-
tation. How large this fraction is will depend on the individual 
characteristics of each bilateral relation. Formally, 𝑡𝑖𝑗 is defined as 
1
𝜏𝑖𝑗
, 
where  𝜏𝑖𝑗 > 1. Thus, the price of i goods in j can then be written as 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖, where 𝜏𝑖𝑗 =
1
𝑡𝑖𝑗
 and 𝑝𝑖  is the supply price of the firm in i. 
The nominal value of exports from i to j is then 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗. 
Note that the trade cost term 𝜏𝑖𝑗  is analogous to the accessibility 
term, 𝜙𝑖𝑗, from the previous section. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
total (nominal) income in country i is given by 𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗 , as was also 
discussed in the previous section. This assumption can be thought of as 
a market clearing condition. 
Combining the above assumptions with the budget constraint, we get 
the following Lagrange function for utility maximization with respect to 
𝑐𝑖𝑗   
2.7 𝐿 = [∑ 𝛽𝑖
1−𝜎
𝜎 ∙ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜎−1
𝜎
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆 [∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 𝑌𝑗] 
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where 𝜆 is the Lagrange Multiplier. Maximization yields the following 
first order condition: 
2.8 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝑖𝑗
= [∑ 𝛽𝑖
1−𝜎
𝜎 ∙ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜎−1
𝜎
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
1
𝜎−1
𝛽𝑖
1−𝜎
𝜎 𝑐𝑖𝑗
−
1
𝜎  − 𝜆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖 = 0 
 
Along with the budget constraint this yields the following demand 
function (for full derivation see appendix A1): 
2.9 𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
(𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖)
1−𝜎
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎 𝑌𝑗  
 
Where 𝑃𝑗 = [∑ (𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖)
1−𝜎𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
1/(1−𝜎)
 is the CES price index of 
country j. Note that a higher 𝛽𝑖  implies a lower demand for i's product 
in j. This is consistent with the interpretation of 𝛽𝑖  as an inverse 
measure of quality. If I were to follow Head and Mayer (2014) the term 
𝛼𝑖
𝜎−1 would replace 𝛽𝑖
1−𝜎
 in the numerator and demand would 
increase with 𝛼𝑖  making the interpretation as a measure of 
attractiveness of i’s goods clear.  
Inserting (2.9) into the market clearing condition 𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗  and 
solving for (𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖)
1−𝜎 yield 
2.10 
(𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖)
1−𝜎 =
𝑌𝑖
∑ (
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
)
1−𝜎
𝑌𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
 
Now, define world nominal GDP as 𝑌𝑤 = ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Expanding the right 
hand side of equation (2.10) by (1/𝑌𝑤) ∙ (1/𝑌𝑤)−1 , and inserting the 
resulting expression back into the demand equation (2.9) yields: 
2.11 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = (
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
)
1−𝜎
𝑌𝑗𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
[∑(
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
)
1−𝜎
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑗=1
]
−1
  
Rearranging equation (2.11) yields the Anderson and van Wincoop 
gravity model: 
2.12 𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑌𝑗𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
(
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝛱𝑖𝑃𝑗
)
1−𝜎
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Where 𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎 and 𝛱𝑖
1−𝜎 are multilateral resistance terms. They are 
defined as: 
2.13 𝛱𝑖
1−𝜎 =∑(
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑗
)
1−𝜎
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑗=1
  
 
2.147 𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎 =∑(
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝛱𝑖
)
1−𝜎 𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑖=1
  
The Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model is groundbreaking in the 
sense that it was the first to formally incorporate the concept of 
multilateral resistance into the gravity model. Failure to control for 
multilateral resistance has been labeled the “gold medal mistake” of 
gravity research by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). According to Head 
and Mayer (2014), almost every paper preceding Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) is awarded this gold medal. 
Trade costs 
Unfortunately, the trade cost term in (2.12) is not directly observable. 
Anderson and van Wincoop use the following proxy for trade costs: 
2.15  𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜌
𝑒𝛾𝐵𝑖𝑗   
In (2.15) 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is bilateral distance, 𝐵𝑖𝑗  is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the two regions i and j are separated by a border. The particular 
proxies used by Anderson and van Wincoop are specific to their 
problem as they are trying to solve the “McCallum border puzzle”. I will 
not discuss the reasons for their exact specification, but it is useful to 
specify their trade cost function here as the functional form used is 
crucial for my own estimations in chapter 4. Their way of specifying the 
trade costs has become standard in the gravity literature (see e.g. Egger 
and Larch, 2011; Shepard, 2013 and Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). 
Limitations of the Anderson and van Wincoop model 
Although the inclusion of multilateral resistance is a pivotal 
contribution in the field, the Anderson and van Wincoop model has its 
limitations. Many of these have been corrected for by others, and I will 
                                                             
7  The expression in (2.14) is obtained by expanding the right hand side of equation 
(2.10) by (1/𝑌𝑤) ∙ (1/𝑌𝑤)−1 , inserting the resulting expression into the price index 
term 𝑃𝑗 = [∑ (𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖)
1−𝜎𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
1/(1−𝜎)
 and inserting for 𝛱𝑖
1−𝜎.  
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introduce some in the next subsection. But there are also some 
problems with the model where the literature is limited, and where 
there is scope for future research. 
An obvious problem with the model is that it analyzes trade at the 
aggregated level only. The assumption that each country produces only 
one good suppresses the fact that trade frictions affect different sectors 
differently. Anderson and van Wincoop admit to this limitation in their 
paper (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 footnote 8).  
In light of the preceding literature on distance in trade, the success of 
Anderson and van Wincoop is to formally include the ideas of Polak 
(1996) and Krugman (1995) that distances to all trading partners 
matter. A next step would be to include the insight from the field of eco-
nomic geography (as in e.g. Fujita et al, 1999). In this field the location 
of economic activity is assumed endogenous to the firms. Hence 
income becomes a function of geographical location as production is 
clustered spatially. In terms of the gravity equation (2.12) this would 
mean that GDP would be a function of distance. Research in this field is 
limited. 
Another issue with the model is the possible reversed causal relation 
between GDP and trade flows. High income will lead to more trade, but 
it is also quite clear that more trade can lead to higher income. This 
issue has to my knowledge not been sufficiently addressed in the 
gravity literature, even though it is well-established empirically (e.g by 
Irwin and Terviö, 2002). 
Alternative specifications of the gravity equation 
Head and Mayer (2014) underline the flexibility of the structural 
gravity equation (2.3) in terms of the different microeconomic frame-
works it can be adapted to.  
Demand side specifications  
Bergstrand et al. (2013) derive an alternative gravity equation based on 
a general equilibrium model where the supply side is modeled specifi-
cally and the assumption of trade separability is lifted. The model uti-
lizes a Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman framework where consumer’s preferences 
are determined by a “love for variety” and firms operate under mono-
polistic competition with increasing returns to scale (Bergstrand et al. 
2013; Head and Mayer, 2014). This model is also relevant for the 
preceding discussion as it is used along with the Anderson and van 
Wincoop model in the ECORYS study on transatlantic non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter (ECORYS, 
2009a).   
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The main contribution of Bergstrand et al. (2013) is the development of 
a gravity model that allows for asymmetric trade costs and proper esti-
mation of the elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of substitution is 
needed to conduct comparative statics analysis. Anderson and van 
Wincoop have to make an educated guess on the value of the elasticity 
of substitution based on previous estimations in their paper. 
Bergstrand et al. (2013) criticize this and show through various Monte 
Carlo exercises that this can lead to significant biases of the compara-
tive statics results. I have included a formal derivation of the 
Bergstrand et al. (2013) gravity model in appendix A2. The model is 
not directly relevant as I will focus the Anderson and van Wincoop in 
the following chapters, but the framework is used by many (e.g. by 
Feenstra, 2004). The derivation in the appendix also demonstrates that 
the fixed effects regression version of the Bergstrand et al. model 
similar to the Anderson and van Wincoop fixed effects regression 
model which I discuss below. 
Supply side specifications 
On the supply side, the most relevant derivations of the structural 
gravity model are the ones allowing for heterogeneity of firms’ 
productivity, as discussed above. This makes it is possible to analyze 
how trade costs affect the production structure. If a trade frictions 
increase marginal costs, trade will be reduced via the extensive margin, 
i.e. through reducing the production within each firm. If fixed costs are 
increased, trade will decrease as a result of fewer firms being able to 
produce. This kind of model is used in the paper by Egger and Larch 
(2011) which is used in the IFO study on the effects of the TTIP 
agreement.  
Gravity estimation 
Unfortunately, the multilateral resistance terms in (2.13) and (2.14) are 
not observable. This poses a problem for estimation. Another problem 
stems from the multiplicative nature of the gravity model. In this 
section I will discuss the reasons for, the consequences of and some of 
the solutions to these problems.  
Estimation in Anderson and van Wincoop 
The pivotal role played by Anderson and van Wincoop in terms of their 
impact on the theory of gravity is not the case when it comes to 
estimation. To be able to solve the model in terms of observed 
variables, Anderson and van Wincoop make additional assumptions. 
Looking back at the general specification of the structural gravity 
model in (2.3) and (2.4), note that the model in (2.12) – (2.14) assumes 
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that j’s expenditure, 𝑋𝑗 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖 , is equal to its nominal income 𝑌𝑗. In 
their paper they also assume symmetrical trade costs, 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑗𝑖 . 
Together, these assumptions imply 𝛱𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖  and make it possible to 
solve the equation system in (2.13) and (2.14) implicitly as a function 
of observables, i.e. GDPs and proxies for trade costs. Anderson and van 
Wincoop then suggest using nonlinear least squares estimation (NLS) 
for empirical estimation. The assumption of symmetrical trade cost is 
quite strong and has received criticism in the literature, e.g. by 
Bergstrand et al. (2013). Their model allows for asymmetrical trade 
costs. The use of NLS estimation has also been criticized (see Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). 
Fixed effects OLS estimation 
A popular way to control for multilateral resistance, which does not 
require assuming symmetrical trade costs, is fixed effects estimation. 
By effectively creating a dummy variable for every exporter and 
importer included in the estimation, all country specific effects are 
taken into account. Formally, by taking the logs of equation (2.12) we 
get 
 
2.16  
 
ln𝑋𝑖𝑗 = − ln𝑌𝑤 + ln𝑌𝑖 +ln𝑌𝑗
+ (1 − 𝜎) ln𝜏𝑖𝑗 − (1 − 𝜎) ln𝛱𝑖 − (1 −𝜎)ln  𝑃𝑗
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is an added stochastic error term. By putting the terms 
together we can write this as: 
2.17  ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝐹𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   
2.18  𝐶 = − ln𝑌𝑤   
2.19  𝐹𝑖 = ln𝑌𝑖 − (1 − 𝜎) ln𝛱𝑖  
2.20  𝐹𝑗 = ln𝑌𝑗 − (1 − 𝜎)ln𝑃𝑗   
Equation (2.17) is the standard gravity equation used for fixed effects 
estimation, where 𝐹𝑖  and 𝐹𝑗  are the exporter and importer fixed effects, 
defined by (2.19 and (2.20). It captures all the information inherited in 
the multilateral resistance terms, and allows for OLS estimation. This is 
much less cumbersome than NLS estimation and has become very 
common in the literature (Head and Mayer, 2014). Note that since 
world GDP is constant across all country pairs it becomes the 
regression constant C.  
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Unfortunately, fixed effects estimation does not come without 
limitations. All information in the single country dimension is inherited 
in the fixed effects of equation (2.19) and (2.20). This estimation 
method is therefore unable to single out any information on variables 
inherited in the fixed effects, i.e. any variables which are constant 
across all exporters (importers) for a given importer (exporter), such as 
GDP. Another weakness when using fixed effects estimation method 
with OLS compared to NLS is that zero-observations in trade matrices 
are discarded due to the fact that the natural logarithm of zero is 
undefined.  
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation  
Along with zero-observations, the problem of heteroskedasticity often 
occurs in trade data. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) present an elegant and 
simple solution that fixes both these problems. They argue that the 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator should be the 
workhorse estimator for gravity research, as it solves both these 
problems and can still be used with country fixed effects estimation.  
Heteroskedasticity 
Technically, the error term  𝜀𝑖𝑗   in (2.16) is defined as 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = ln 𝜂𝑖𝑗  
where 𝜂𝑖𝑗  is the stochastic element in a regression version of equation 
(2.12): 
2.21 𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
[
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝛱𝑖𝑃𝑗
]
1−𝜎
𝜂𝑖𝑗   
where the 𝜂𝑖𝑗’s are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed. Another important assumption for OLS consistency is that 
the error term does not depend on any of the regressors, 
i.e. 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑗 |𝑌𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 , 𝜏𝑖𝑗 , 𝛱𝑖 , 𝑃𝑗) = 𝐸(ln 𝜂𝑖𝑗 |𝑌𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 , 𝜏𝑖𝑗 , 𝛱𝑖 ,𝑃𝑗) = 0. In other 
words, the validity of the process of log-linearizing (2.21) depends 
critically on the assumption that ln𝜂𝑖𝑗 , and therefore also 𝜂𝑖𝑗 , is 
independent of the regressors. However, when taking the expected 
value of the natural logarithm of a random variable, like 𝐸(ln 𝜂𝑖𝑗), the 
result will depend on both the mean and the higher moments of 𝜂𝑖𝑗  
(Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Therefore, if the dataset suffers from 
heteroskedasticity, i.e. the variance of 𝜂𝑖𝑗  depends on one of the 
regressors, then 𝐸(ln 𝜂𝑖𝑗 |𝑌𝑖 , 𝑌𝑗 , 𝜏𝑖𝑗 , 𝛱𝑖 ,𝑃𝑗) ≠ 0, and the conditions for 
consistency of the OLS estimator is violated, which will lead to biased 
estimates. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that heteroskedasticity 
often is the case with trade data, and therefore suggest using a non-
linear estimator, i.e. one which does not require log-linearization. 
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Through thorough Monte Carlo experimentation, Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) show that using log-linearization and OLS estimation achieves 
greatly biased estimates. They also test the PPML estimator against the 
OLS, NLS and Gamma Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimators. Four 
different specifications of heteroskedasticity are used during the tests. 
They conclude that the workhorse estimator for gravity models, and 
indeed any model with a constant-elasticity framework, should be the 
PPML estimator. It outperforms the other estimators and is relatively 
more robust across a wide range of heteroskedastic specifications and 
measurement errors in the data (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
Furthermore it is far less cumbersome in terms of calculation, as 
opposed to e.g. nonlinear least squares which is used by Anderson and 
Van Wincoop (2003). Based on this I use the PPML estimator for the 
estimations in chapter 4. 
Zero trade flows 
Since PPML is a nonlinear estimator it is also able to tackle the problem 
of zero trade flows in the dataset. As mentioned above, the gravity 
equation has its roots in the Newtonian Law of Gravity, which is a 
multiplicative formula. A problem with this analogy is that while 
gravitational force never can be zero (only infinitely small), zero trade 
flows are often observed. Thus, by log linearizing the gravity equation, 
we are effectively neglecting all zero trade flows and potentially 
creating a sample bias. Since the PPML estimator does not require use 
of the log of exports this bias is eliminated. 
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Studies on TTIP 
Before proceeding to estimation of the gravity model, I demonstrate 
how it is used differently in two comprehensive studies trying to predict 
the effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) – a trade integration agreement between the EU and US cur-
rently under negotiation. The first study is performed by the Leibniz 
Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich (IFO), and 
was completed in January 2013 on behalf of the German Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology. Although the primary concern 
is effects of TTIP on the German economy, the study also examines the 
effects on the rest of the EU and the US as well as the rest of the world. 
The second study is performed by Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) for the European Commission, and was published in March 
2013. 
In both studies the gravity equation plays a key role. However, their 
conclusions are quite different, both in terms of the magnitude of the 
effects and sometimes also regarding the direction of the outcome. The 
latter case is especially true for the effects on TTIP’s non-members. This 
has to do with the methods used. In particular, the two studies differ in 
how the gravity equation is utilized and how they account for the 
presence of NTBs. Both studies agree that NTBs will be the biggest 
challenge for the TTIP agreement, and they have very different ways of 
implementing this in their models. My goal in this chapter is to 
demonstrate how these underlying methodological differences can 
explain the divergent results. I first present and compare some of the 
main results of the studies, then I briefly discuss the overall approach 
before going into an in-depth discussion of the use of gravity modelling 
in each study. 
Main results 
As mentioned above, the studies are done separately and with different 
objectives. The CEPR study has a broader perspective and includes 
effects on trade in services and investments in addition to goods trade. 
It also includes environmental and sustainability impacts. The IFO 
study considers trade in goods only. Therefore, since my goal is to 
compare the studies, I only focus on the results regarding trade in 
goods in the CEPR study.  Furthermore, since the overall focus is on the 
gravity equation and how it is used differently in the two studies, I only 
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discuss results on GDP and trade flows as these are more directly linked 
to the use of the gravity model. 
Scenarios 
Both studies look at different scenarios where the TTIP agreement is 
more or less effective at reducing trade barriers. The scenarios are 
summarized in table 3.1. The IFO study has two scenarios; a limited 
scenario where tariffs are eliminated and a comprehensive scenario 
where NTBs are reduced as well. CEPR follow the same pattern, but 
they also distinguish between a less ambitious and an ambitious 
comprehensive scenario. Although the scenarios differ somewhat, the 
basic idea is the same in the two studies: a limited scenario mimicking 
an agreement that only covers tariffs and a deeper one which 
successfully eliminates NTBs as well. As pointed out earlier, both 
studies agree that NTB removal is crucial for the success of the 
agreement, and the results confirm this in both studies. One of the 
reasons that CEPR looks at different levels of NTB reductions while IFO 
does not is that IFO’s methodology restricts them in this area. They are 
also unable to be explicit about the percentage reduction. I get back to 
the reasons for this below.  
 
  
  Table 3.1 TTIP scenarios in CEPR and IFO 
  IFO    CEPR 
Limited scenario  Tariffs eliminated    98% tariff reduction 
Comprehensive 
scenario(s) 
 
Both tariffs and NTBs 
reduced 
   Less ambitious 
     
98 % tariff reduction 
10% NTB reduction on 
goods 
 
    Ambitious 
     
100 % tariff reduction 
25% NTB reduction on 
goods 
 
  Sources: CEPR 2013, table 4 and IFO 2013b, pp. 6-8 
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GDP results 
Table 3.2 summarizes the predicted GDP effects in the two studies. 
Overall, the directions of the effects are similar. In the limited scenario, 
IFO estimates that GDP will increase by 0.75 percent for the US and 
0.24 percent for Germany. Unfortunately, they do not report an EU 
average. The average effect on TTIP members in the IFO study is 
positive, but they stress that the degree of heterogeneity is high, and 
that it will lead to negative effects for some member countries. 
Although they do not report an average for the rest of the world, they 
also report that GDP will decrease for countries that are attached to the 
EU and US through existing trade agreements, e.g. NAFTA and the EEA 
(IFO 2013b). CEPR predict that tariff elimination (limited scenario) will 
have positive GDP effects for EU countries as well as the US. Their 
estimated GDP effect is much lower than the IFO estimates. They also 
report an expected 0.01 percent decrease in the rest of the world’s GDP. 
 
 
 
The comprehensive scenarios are more interesting. There are two 
particular points that stand out. First, the GDP effects on EU and USA 
Table 3.2 GDP effects in IFO and CEPR 
  IFO    CEPR 
Limited scenario 
   
US: 0.75% 
Germany: 0.24% 
(EU avg. not reported) 
 
Row.: not reported  
 
    
EU: 0.1% 
US: 0.04% 
Row.: -0.01% 
 
Comprehensive 
scenario(s) 
 
EU: 4.95%  
US: 13.38%  
Row.: decrease  
   Less ambitious 
     
EU: 0.27%  
US: 0.21%  
Row: 0.07%  
 
    Ambitious 
     
EU: 0.48%  
US: 0.39%  
Row: 0.14%  
 
  Sources: CEPR 2013: table 6 , 16 and 41.  
                IFO 2013b, figure 4  and 5. 
                Medin and Melchior 2013 
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are much larger in the IFO study compared to the CEPR. For the US the 
estimated GDP increase is 13.38 percent, almost 13 percentage points 
higher (i.e. 34 times) than the most optimistic scenario in CEPR. 
Second, the IFO study predicts a decrease in GDP for the rest of the 
world, while CEPR expects an increase. One reason for this is that CEPR 
includes what they call spillover effects for third countries.  
If TTIP is successful in reducing NTBs as well as tariffs, it is important 
to consider these spillover effects since generally, contrary to tariffs, 
NTBs are not discriminatory by nature. When two countries agree on 
lower tariffs, third countries are automatically faced with higher tariffs 
and are therefore discriminated against. On the other hand, if the two 
countries agree on e.g. a new hygiene standard on import on certain 
agricultural goods, it is less likely that they are able to discriminate 
against third countries in the same way. This is the motivation for CEPR 
to include the spillover effects. It also serves an example of how NTBs 
work differently than tariffs. 
CEPR distinguish between two types of such spillover effects. Countries 
exporting to the EU and the US will to some extent benefit from the 
improved regulatory conditions negotiated in the agreement. This will 
grant third countries easier access to both the EU and US markets, 
instead of having to adjust their products differently for the two 
markets. This is what they call the direct spillover effect as it involves a 
direct cut in trade costs for countries exporting to both the EU and US 
(CEPR, 2013). Also, since the TTIP trading block would be very large in 
terms of trade volume, it is likely that third countries will get incentives 
to adapt to the same harmonization of product standards and 
regulations as TTIP. A global convergence toward common regulations 
is called the indirect spillover effect (CEPR, 2013). IFO does not include 
these spillover effects, which might contribute to explaining why the 
results for third countries are negative (and sometimes large in 
magnitude) in their study. 
In addition to the estimates in table 3.2, the CEPR study includes a 
breakdown of the estimates. They report that (in the ambitious case) 54 
percent of the EU GDP increase is due to NTB reductions, and that 22 
percent is from tariff reduction. For the US, only 10 percent of the 
increase is due to tariff elimination, and 59 percent comes from NTB 
reduction. 8 This again highlights the importance of NTB reduction for 
any trade agreement. The pattern of larger effects due to NTBs relative 
                                                             
8  The remaining increases come from the direct and indirect spillover effects, 
reduction in NTBs on services and procurement. I have chosen not to report these 
here to save space. The full effects can be found in CEPR 2013, chapter 5. 
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to tariffs occurs in nearly all their results and will not be stated for the 
remainder of the chapter.  
Trade flow results 
Table 3.3 shows the average effects on trade flows in the two studies. 
Note that the IFO study only shows effects on exports while CEPR 
shows effects on both imports and exports. Also, CEPR does not include 
trade flow effects for the rest of the world.  
 
As with the GDP estimates, the IFO study predicts much larger effects 
on trade than CEPR. It estimates that exports within TTIP will increase 
by an astonishing 92.8 percent in the comprehensive scenario. In 
contrast, the most ambitious scenario in the CEPR study shows an 
increase of 5.9 and 8 percent increases in exports for the EU and the US 
respectively. In this area, the CEPR study seems somewhat conserva-
tive. In a meta-analysis performed by Head and Mayer (2014) based on 
257 independent gravity studies they find that the average increase in 
trade flows between fellow members of a trade agreement is 59 percent 
higher relative to trade between countries that are not in a trade 
agreement. My own estimations in the next chapter confirm this 
finding. 
Table 3.3 Trade flow effects in IFO and CEPR 
  IFO  CEPR 
  Exports  Imports Exports 
Limited scenario 
   
Within TTIP: 5.8 % 
 
Between  
non-members: -0.5% 
 
 
EU: 1%  
US: 1.13% 
EU: 1.18% 
US: 1.91 
Comprehensive 
scenario(s) 
  
Within TTIP: 
92.8% 
 
Between TTIP members and 
non-members:  
78.8 % 
 
Between non-members:  
3.4 % 
 
 Less ambitious 
  
EU: 2,91% 
US: 3.81% 
EU: 3,37% 
US: 4.75% 
  Ambitious 
  
EU: 5.11% 
US: 4.74 
EU: 5.91% 
US: 8,02 % 
Sources: CEPR 2013: table 20 and table 21 
                IFO 2013a: table II.4 
                IFO 2013b, pp. 7  
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Note on sector level results 
So far only aggregated effects are presented, but both studies include 
predictions on disaggregated levels. An in-depth discussion of 
differences and similarities between the studies on sector level is 
beyond the scope of my thesis. However, there are a few points worth 
mentioning regarding the sector level results in the two studies.  
From the CEPR study it seems that industrial and manufacturing 
goods will experience the biggest trade flow increase between the EU 
and US. The US motor vehicle exports to the EU is expected to be the 
winner. Also, CEPR estimate large increases in processed foods and 
chemical trade within TTIP. Interestingly, the results show that for 
many sectors exports will increase in both countries, i.e. we will likely 
see an increase in intra-industry trade as a result of the agreement 
according to CEPR. This is in line with the “new trade theory” 
pioneered by Krugman (1980). 
Contrary to CEPR, the IFO study concludes that it is the agricultural 
sector that will experience the largest trade increase, albeit from a very 
low level. They also expect large increases for the industrial sector.  
Discussion of the main results 
The most striking difference between the two studies is the magnitude 
of the predicted effects of TTIP. Throughout, the IFO study predicts 
larger effects, often many times that of CEPR. I argue that there is little 
chance that both studies are “correct”. By this I mean that it is unlikely 
that the results would converge, due to the law of large numbers, if the 
studies were repeated again and again, while the methods were left 
unchanged. On the contrary, it is my opinion that there are funda-
mental methodical differences between the two studies, and that this is 
the cause of the divergent results. At the very least this serves as moti-
vation to dig into the underlying methodologies, which is the goal in 
the next two sections. However, an in-depth discussion of the entire 
model framework in both studies is beyond the scope of my thesis. 
Therefore, the discussion is limited to their implementation of NTBs 
through gravity models.  
IFO methodology 
The IFO methodology involves comparative statics analysis of gravity 
estimations, based on Egger and Larch9 (2011). They compare a factual 
base scenario with a counter-factual scenario where the TTIP agree-
ment is simulated based on an estimated average effect of existing 
trade agreements. The average effect is obtained by running a gravity 
                                                             
9  Mario Larch is one of the writers of the IFO study. 
Non-tariff barriers, trade integration and the gravity model 33 
estimation using a bilateral dummy variable for existing agreements. 
An advantage when using this method is that it does not require 
explicit data on NTBs and tariffs, as all trade barrier reductions are 
argued to be accounted for by the RTA dummy. Thus, the problem of 
NTB measurement is overcome. Further, IFO relies on the insight from 
Egger et al. (2011), where they account for the possible endogeneity of 
trade agreements in the gravity model. To elaborate on the methodo-
logy, each of these papers is discussed in turn in the following 
subsections. 
Comparative statics in Egger and Larch (2011) 
The core methodology used by IFO is based on Egger and Larch 2011. 
In this paper the authors give an assessment of the effects of the 
“Europe agreement” between the EU and 10 central and eastern 
European countries in the 1990s. The goal of the paper is to study the 
ex-post effects of the agreement. However, the methodology can also be 
used to predict ex-ante effects of potential trade agreements, which is 
what they do in the IFO study.  
The basic idea in Egger and Larch (2011) is to run two separate gravity 
estimations and compare them. In the first case they estimate a factual 
base scenario where they include all relevant variables for gravity 
estimation. In the paper this includes a bilateral dummy variable for 
membership in the Europe agreement. In the second case, they 
construct a counterfactual scenario where the relevant policy variables 
are changed. Egger and Larch (2011) set the Europe agreement 
variable to zero for all observations. To get the trade effect of the 
agreement they compare the base scenario to the counterfactual 
scenario, i.e. the estimated base scenario trade flows minus the 
counterfactual scenario trade flows relative to the counterfactual trade 
flows in percent.  
To further clarify this methodology, consider again the Anderson and 
van Wincoop gravity equation: 
3.1 
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑤
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
= [
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝛱𝑖𝑃𝑗
]
1−𝜎
≡ 𝑥𝑖𝑗  
As the GDP terms are moved to the left hand side, the equation now 
measures GDP-normalized aggregate exports from i to j which I refer to 
as 𝑥𝑖𝑗. Equation (3.1) is similar to equation (8) in Egger and Larch 
(2011). The main difference is that I have dropped the indicator vari-
able that distinguishes between firms ability to produce given the cur-
rent costs, i.e. the assumption of heterogeneous firm productivity is 
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relaxed. This is done for simplicity and since it does not change the 
understanding of the methodology. Nonetheless, I wish to stress that 
the inclusion of firm heterogeneity adds strength to the IFO method as 
it allows them to analyze the effects of trade agreements on the 
extensive and intensive production margins. This is not taken into 
account in the gravity model used by CEPR.  
Let the subscript c denote the counterfactual scenario where the 
relevant policy variable is altered, i.e where the Europe Agreement 
dummy variable inherited in the trade costs 𝜏𝑖𝑗 is set to zero for all 
observations. Then, following the logic described above, the 
percentage change in trade flows due to the Europe Agreement, ∆𝑥𝑖𝑗, is 
given by 
3.2 ∆𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≡
(𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎𝛱𝑖
𝜎−1𝑃𝑗
𝜎−1) − (𝜏𝑐,𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎𝛱𝑐,𝑖
𝜎−1𝑃𝑐,𝑗
𝜎−1)
𝜏𝑐,𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎𝛱𝑐,𝑖
𝜎−1𝑃𝑐,𝑗
𝜎−1 ∙ 100  
Similarly their model defines the real GDP of country i as 𝑌𝑖 =
𝜃𝑖
1/(1−𝜎)
𝛱𝑖
−1  which leads them to the following expression for 
percentage change in nominal GDP 
   
3.3 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑗 ≡
(𝜃𝑖
1/(1−𝜎)
𝛱𝑖
−1) − (𝜃𝑐,𝑖
1/(1−𝜎)
𝛱𝑐,𝑖
−1)
𝜃𝑐,𝑖
1/(1−𝜎)
𝛱𝑐,𝑖
−1
∙ 100 
 
where 𝜃𝑖 ≡ 𝑌𝑖/𝑌𝑤 and 𝑌𝑤 = ∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  is world GDP with N countries. To 
save space I will not include the formal derivation of equation (3.3) and 
the expression for GDP as this requires a deeper examination of their 
model. My main point here is to show how they obtain their estimates 
of the effect of policy changes by comparing a counterfactual and a 
base scenario. The comparative static principle from Egger and Larch 
make up the core method for calculating GDP and trade flow effects of 
TTIP in the IFO study. Clearly, the gravity equation plays a pivotal role 
for their results.  
Endogeneity and firm heterogeneity in Egger et al. (2011) 
In addition to the paper by Egger and Larch, IFO also relies on the 
insight from Egger et al. (2011) (IFO 2013b). The aim of this paper is to 
provide a better empirical gravity model that brings together three 
important issues in the literature; controlling for multilateral 
resistance, zero-observations in trade matrices, and the endogeneity of 
trade agreements. As discussed in the previous chapter, fixed effects 
and PPML estimation can be used to account for the two first issues.  
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Endogeneity 
The last issue of controlling for endogeneity of trade agreements is, in 
my opinion, the biggest contribution of Egger et al. (2011). Further-
more, it is an advantage to the IFO method compared to that of CEPR. 
Intuitively, trade agreements lead to higher trade flows between 
members, but countries that trade more are also more likely to engage 
in trade agreements. This reverse causality calls for instrument vari-
ables to be used to avoid biased estimates.  
Finding instruments is challenging. They need to satisfy the 
requirements of relevance and validity, i.e. they need to be significantly 
correlated with the probability10 of forming trade agreements 
(relevance), but they cannot have any effect on exports other than 
through trade agreements (validity). Egger et al. (2011) propose three 
instruments; (i) a dummy variable indicating whether there ever was a 
colonial relationship between the two counties in question, (ii) a 
dummy variable indicating whether they ever had the same colonizer 
and (iii) a dummy variable indicating whether they ever were the same 
country. These variables are elsewhere commonly used in gravity 
equations to control for historical and cultural factors, but they have 
not been used as instruments prior to Egger et al. (2011). To test the 
relevance of the instruments they perform an F-test in the first stage 
estimation on the joint null hypothesis that all the coefficients on the 
instruments are equal to zero. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected 
(Egger et al. 2011).  
The instruments validity is harder to prove. They perform two tests to 
argue for validity. In the first test they include the instruments in the 
second stage regression and perform an F-test like the one above. In 
this case the p-value is 0.48 (Egger et al. 2011). Hence, they cannot 
reject the null hypothesis at any conventional level of confidence. In 
the second test they perform a test on the overidentifying restrictions 
using a log-linearized model which restricts them to positive trade-flow 
values. Here as well, the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected as the p-
value equals 0.48 also in this case (Egger et al. 2011). 
It is important to stress that the above tests cannot be taken as proof of 
instrument validity. They are to be taken as validity arguments only. In 
other words, the validity of the instruments can still be questioned. 
There is reason to believe that whether two countries have had a 
                                                             
10  As trade agreements enter the model as a dummy variable, Egger et al. (2011) use a 
probit model in the first stage regression. Hence, the correct interpretation of the 
first stage coefficients is their ability to influence the probability of forming a 
bilateral trade agreement.  
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colonial relation, have had the same colonizer or have ever been the 
same country can affect the bilateral exports other than through the 
probability of forming a trade agreement. Consider for instance the 
bilateral relation between Britain and India, who have a previous 
colonial relationship. One of the reasons for Britain colonizing India 
was to control India’s resources. After India’s independence in 1947, it 
is likely that there still was a demand for Indian goods in Britain (and 
vice versa), and that this demand has been influenced by the economic 
ties resulting from years of colonial rule over India. This could lead to a 
larger trade flow between India and Britain than what would have been 
the case had Britain not colonized India, even though the countries 
have never been in a trade agreement. Thus, there is arguably a 
potential link between bilateral exports and the dummy variable indi-
cating colonial relations other than through trade agreements. This 
example illustrates the problems with and importance of finding good 
instruments for trade agreements. 
Nonetheless, when controlling for endogeneity of trade agreements 
using the instruments above Egger et al. (2011) find that the estimates 
of the coefficient on trade agreements increase relative to the estimates 
when trade agreements are regarded as exogenous. This leads them to 
conclude that failure to regard trade agreements as endogenous biases 
the estimates downwards. This implies that the unobservable factors 
determining the creation of trade agreements come along with 
unobservable factors that on average have negative effects on trade 
flows (Egger et al. 2011). This can explain why the estimated trade flow 
effect of TTIP is higher in the IFO study than what is normally observed 
in the literature (e.g in the meta-analysis by Head and Mayer, 2014). 
However, it is important to stress that the legitimacy of this result 
hinges critically on the somewhat shaky validity arguments. 
Firm heterogeneity 
Egger et al. (2011) also make a distinction between the extensive and 
intensive margins of firm’s production. After controlling for endo-
geneity, they find that membership in a trade agreement has a 
significant impact on the intensive margin, but not the extensive. This 
implies that trade agreements are effective at reducing marginal costs 
of trade, such that exporting firms will produce and export more (inten-
sive margin). On the other hand, trade agreements seem to have little 
effect lowering fixed costs which would have increased the number of 
exporting firms (extensive margin). This is an important result as it 
shows that entry into a transatlantic trade agreement might alter the 
industrial organization of a country. Yet again, this also underlines the 
importance of NTB reduction in trade agreements. Although NTBs come 
Non-tariff barriers, trade integration and the gravity model 37 
in a variety of forms it is natural to expect that they in principle can be 
considered non-proportional, i.e. fixed (IFO 2013, Medin, 2014). 
Tariffs, on the other hand, are proportional by definition. Thus, the 
finding in Egger et al. can be taken as evidence that existing trade 
agreements on average are relatively ineffective at reducing NTBs, and 
since it is widely agreed upon that NTBs are more important for a 
transatlantic agreement to be successful, this highlights the challenge 
facing the TTIP agreement. However, Egger et al. stress that the bias 
arising due to failure to control for the presence of firm heterogeneity 
seems less relevant than the endogeneity bias.  
Discussion of the IFO methodology 
Together with the insights from Egger et al. (2011), the IFO method for 
estimating the effects of TTIP is based on the comparative statics 
methodology from Egger and Larch (2011), as sketched above. To 
construct the counter-factual scenario they estimate the effect of 
existing trade agreements as in Egger and Larch (2011), only using a 
more comprehensive dataset on trade agreements. The results of these 
estimations are then used to simulate the trade effects of TTIP, which is 
then compared to the base scenario to get percentage change on trade-
flows and GDP (IFO, 2013b). This implies the underlying assumption 
that the TTIP agreement will affect world trade and countries individual 
GDP according to the average effect of existing trade agreements. All 
active trade agreements are given equal weights; regardless of the 
members’ initial trade barriers, and the depth and duration of the 
agreement. This approach is somewhat questionable as it is likely that 
different trade agreements have different levels of efficiency regarding 
their ability to reduce trade costs and induce trade amongst its 
members.  
Another crucial assumption inherited in their method is that existing 
trade agreements have reduced both tariffs and NTBs between its mem-
bers. By estimating an average treatment effect of trade agreements 
they therefore claim to have solved the problem of NTB measurement. 
All trade barrier reductions accomplished in trade agreements, 
including both tariffs and NTBs, are assumed to be implicitly accounted 
for in the average effect. Explicit data on NTBs and tariffs are therefore 
not included. 11 This is arguably a nice feature as it captures the 
realistic level of NTB reduction from trade agreements. However, it also 
assumes that TTIP will follow an average pattern of tariff and NTB 
reductions observed in other agreements, and makes it impossible to 
                                                             
11  When looking at the limited scenario with tariff elimination only, IFO use data on 
observable tariffs and change these in the counterfactual scenario. It is only in the 
comprehensive scenario where they use the general trade agreements effect to 
capture both tariff and NTB reduction. 
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look at different scenarios where the depth of the agreement can be 
varied, as is done in the CEPR study. An obvious problem with this is 
that they are unable to look at scenarios where TTIP is assumed to be 
more effective at NTB reduction compared to the average. Most existing 
trade agreements are primarily (or only) agreements on tariff reduction 
(Estevadeordal et al., 2009). Since the importance of NTB reduction is 
established so clearly in the IFO study, an approach that limits 
flexibility on this deserves criticism. Furthermore, they are unable to be 
explicit about how much trade barriers must be reduced to obtain the 
predicted results. 
A final critique of the IFO methodology concerns the long term perspec-
tive. IFO states that all the results in their study are to be understood as 
long term effects (IFO, 2013a). It is generally assumed that the 
adjustment of the economic variables takes place relatively quickly, 
within 5 - 8 quarters (IFO 2013a). The motivation for this assumption is 
unclear. Remembering the results presented above, it seems somewhat 
extreme that GDP is inspected to increase by 4.95 and 13.38 percent 
within a maximum of two years, for the EU and US respectively. It is 
also not clear whether the estimated effects are reported in present 
value. In the model framework of Egger and Larch (2011) presented in 
equations (1) – (5) there is no discount factor and they do not mention 
anything on this in the report. Hence, one reason for the large results 
could be that they do not discount the future. This might also explain 
some of the difference of the results compared to the CEPR study where 
they use a model in which the future is discounted.  
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CEPR Methodology 
The results from the CEPR study presented in section 3.1 are obtained 
from simulations using the GTAP model (CEPR 2013). GTAP is a multi-
region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of 
global world trade. It can be used to analyze long-term as well as short-
term effects as it allows for trade to impact capital stocks through 
investment effects (CEPR 2013). GTAP uses real world data where 
tariffs and tariff revenues are explicit in the database, and is directly 
incorporated into the analysis. NTBs on the other hand, are not part of 
the data. To incorporate NTBs into the model CEPR relies on a study by 
ECORYS (2009a). The ECORYS study investigates the existence and 
magnitude of NTBs between the EU and US on trade in goods, services 
and investments on sector level. Based on a comprehensive business 
survey, ECORYS constructs an NTB index which is used in a gravity 
model to estimate ad-valorem trade cost equivalents of NTBs. These 
estimates are used directly in the CEPR study on TTIP. Therefore, the 
CEPR results are sensitive to the implementation of the gravity model 
used in the ECORYS study, especially since CEPR constantly emphasize 
the importance of NTBs. How the ECORYS data on NTBs are gathered, 
and how the gravity model is utilized to calculate the ad-valorem trade 
cost equivalents have important consequences for the predictions put 
forth in the CEPR study. 
Data on NTBs 
Contrary to the IFO, the CEPR methodology requires explicit data on 
NTBs; hence the use of the ECORYS NTB data. Gathering this data is not 
trivial as NTBs are difficult both to identify and to measure. It also 
requires a clear definition of NTBs. ECORYS, and hence also CEPR, 
define NTBs as: 
“All non-price and non-quantity restrictions on trade in goods, 
services and investments at the federal and state level. This includes 
border measures (customs procedures, etc.) as well as behind-the-
border measures flowing from domestic laws, regulations and 
practices’.” (ECORYS, 2009a pp. xiii) 
ECORYS gather data on NTBs using two main sources. First of all 
they do a comprehensive literature review where they summarize 
previous studies on NTBs and identify transatlantic NTBs on sector 
level. Second, they perform a comprehensive business survey on 5500 
companies in the EU and US. Each company was asked the question:  
“Consider exporting to the US (EU), keeping in mind your domestic 
market. If 0 represents a completely “free trade” environment, and 100 
represents an entirely closed market due to NTBs, what value between 
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0 – 100 would you use to describe the overall restrictiveness of the US 
(EU) market to your export product […] in this sector?” (ECORYS 2009a, 
p. 10) 
Based on the answers to this question they construct a NTB index. 
For each importer j the index states the average opinion across its 
exporters on the NTB restrictiveness level. Even with 5500, replies the 
survey was not comprehensive enough to create an index that varies 
bilaterally. Hence, the NTBs of country j is constant for all i’s in the 
index, i.e. it varies by importer only. This is an obvious weakness, as it 
is natural to assume that different exporters will face different levels of 
NTB regulations for a given importer j. Remembering the discussion on 
fixed effects estimation in chapter 2, this also has consequences for 
estimation as the NTB index does not vary bilaterally.  
Gravity Estimation in ECORYS 
The NTB index constructed on the basis of the business survey is only 
an index of firm’s perceptions of NTB levels and does not translate 
directly into impacts on costs and prices. Therefore, ECORYS use 
gravity estimation to estimate corresponding ad-valorem trade cost 
equivalents. The trade cost equivalents measure the percentage impact 
on prices of the NTBs, similar to the concept of tariff equivalents. For a 
given level of a NTB on a product, the trade cost equivalents show what 
the equal increase in any other variables causing trade frictions would 
have to be to keep trade at the same level if the NTB was eliminated. 
The increase can come from tariffs alone or any other variable or 
combinations of variables that influence trade cost. In the case of 
gravity modelling, this means all variables used to proxy for the trade 
cost term 𝜏𝑖𝑗 in equation (3.1) above.  
To calculate the trade cost equivalents, the NTB index is used along 
with other proxies for trade costs in the gravity model of Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003). Specifically, the model used for estimation is the 
fixed effects model from equation (2.17): 
3.4 ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝐹𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
 
ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶 + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝐹𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎)ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 
 
All variations that are unique to one country are inherited in the fixed 
effect terms (see equations (2.19) and (2.20) in chapter 2). The trade 
cost term is estimated separately as  
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3.5  
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = ln(1 + 𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾 ln𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿 ln𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜁𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝜁𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗  
where 𝑡𝑖𝑗  is the tariff rate imposed on country i by country j, 𝑛𝑖𝑗  is the 
NTB of country j imposed on country i, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the distance between 
the capitals in country i and j, 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the two countries share a border, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗is a dummy 
variable indicating whether they are on the same continent, and 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗  is a dummy variable indicating whether they have the same 
official language (ECORYS, 2009b). As mentioned above, the NTB data 
does not vary bilaterally. To solve this problem ECORYS make the NTBs 
vary bilaterally by interacting them with bilateral dummy variables 
indicating membership in existing trade agreements: 
 3.6  
 
ln 𝑛𝑖𝑗 =𝛼1 ln(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐸𝑈𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑗)
+ 𝛼2 ln(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑗)
+ 𝛼3 ln(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑗)  
Here, 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑗 is the NTB index, i.e. the average opinion amongst all 
exporters on the NTB level in country j, 𝐷𝐸𝑈 and 𝐷𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴 are dummy 
variables that equal 1 if both countries i and j are members of the EU or 
NAFTA, and  𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑁 equals one if the countries are in different groups, 
i.e. if i is in EU and j is in NAFTA or vice versa (ECORYS, 2009b).  
Interacting the NTB index with the dummy variables makes them vary 
bilaterally, but the interpretation of the elasticities changes somewhat. 
This is discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter where I present 
my own estimations.    
To calculate the trade cost equivalents, ECORYS use the following 
formula calculated from the gravity model in equations (3.4) – (3.6)  
 
3.7  
 
∆ ln(1 + 𝜏𝐸𝑈,𝑗)
=
𝛼3
𝜎
[ln(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑗)
− ln(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑇𝐵𝐴)] 
 
where 𝜏𝐸𝑈,𝑗 measures the trade cost equivalent faced by the EU exports 
to NAFTA member j, and 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝐴 is the average NTB index across all 
importers (ECORYS, 2009b). Thus the expression in (3.7) measures the 
difference in trade costs when exporting to country j relative to the 
average trade costs in the sample, when 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑁= 1. ECORYS obtain the 
ad-valorem trade cost equivalents of the NTB index by solving for  𝜏𝐸𝑈,𝑗 
in equation (3.7). 
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Table 3.4 shows the average results for the goods sectors. Column 
(1) and (3) shows the trade cost equivalents of NTBs, while column (2) 
and (4) show the NTB perception index.  
Discussion of the CEPR methodology and comparison with IFO 
CEPR plug the estimated ad-valorem trade cost equivalents from 
ECORYS into the GTAP model to estimate the effect of TTIP. Contrary to 
the IFO study, this enables CEPR to analyze different levels of ambition 
regarding TTIP’s ability to reduce NTBs. Furthermore, the CEPR study 
does not need assume that the effects of TTIP depends on observed 
effects of existing trade agreements as is the case in the IFO study. A 
third strength to CEPR over IFO is that by using a CGE model they 
distinguish between short and long term effects, and the results are 
discounted to present value.  
The CEPR method is not without problems, however. An important 
critique regards the use of the GTAP model. This is discussed in the IFO 
report, which raises three main points of critique (IFO 2013a,). First, 
the parameterization of the model is not always based on consistent 
econometric estimates. Second, the model assumes full employment 
and a fixed labor stock. This limits the model to analyze sectorial 
interchange of labor rather than long term shifts in equilibrium 
employment. Third, the model is largely based on perfect competition. 
In the CEPR study, the model is calibrated such that perfect 
competition is assumed for most sectors. However, heavy 
manufacturing sectors are modelled with monopolistic competition 
and economics of scale, and products from different countries are 
modelled as imperfect substitutes (CEPR, 2013).  
 
Another important critique concerns the NTB measurement. Relying on 
perceived levels of NTBs can be problematic. There might be NTBs that 
are not accounted for by using this method, and so the estimated level 
Table 3.4: Average NTB trade cost equivalents and NTB perception index  
for transatlantic trade flows  
 
EU exports to US  US exports to EU 
(1) 
Trade cost 
equivalent 
(2) 
NTB index 
 
(3) 
Trade cost 
equivalent 
(4) 
NTB index 
25.4 % 40,74  21.5 % 
 
41,0 
 
Source: table 4.2 in ECORYS (2009a). I have calculated the averages myself as they are 
reported on sector level in the study. 
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of NTB trade cost equivalents might be over- or underestimated. 
Second, the ECORYS business survey does not distinguish between 
countries within the EU as is done in the IFO study. A third point is that 
by calculating ad-valorem trade cost equivalent, NTBs are effectively 
converted into proportional trade costs. However, as discussed above it 
is more natural to consider NTBs as non-proportional costs, which 
might affect trade in other ways than proportional costs, as argued by 
Egger et al. (2011). 
By looking closely at the methods used in the two studies it becomes 
clear how the gravity equation can be used in very different ways, and 
with different purposes. In the IFO study the gravity equation plays a 
defining role in determining the outcome as they are comparing 
different gravity estimations. In CEPR on the other hand, the gravity 
equations plays a smaller role as it is used only to obtain the estimates 
of NTB cost equivalents to be used in the GTAP model. However, in 
both studies the impact of NTBs is accounted for through the use of 
gravity equations; implicitly through the average effect of trade 
agreements on tariff and NTB reductions in IFO, and explicitly by 
calculating ad-valorem trade cost equivalents in the ECORYS study 
used by CEPR.  
In the next chapter I run a separate gravity estimation using a dataset 
including data on tariffs, NTBs and bilateral trade agreements. I rely on 
data from other sources than both the IFO and CEPR (ECORYS) studies, 
and my results can therefore be used to verify some of their results, as 
well as provide further understanding on how the gravity equation is 
used for trade policy analysis.  
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Estimation 
In this chapter, I present my own gravity estimations built upon the 
theoretical and empirical insight from chapter 2. In particular, I 
estimate the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model with data from 
Kee et al. (2009), who have constructed a comprehensive dataset on 
NTBs and tariffs. Another important contribution to my dataset is a 
dummy variable on regional trade agreements (RTA) from de Sousa 
(2011). Throughout the chapter the focus will be on estimating the 
effects of NTBs and different RTA dummies on bilateral exports; first, I 
discuss the econometric specification, second I describe the dataset 
and discuss some descriptive statistics, and finally I present and 
discuss the results of my estimations.  
Econometric specification  
Recall the regression version of the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity 
equation, along with its log-linearized version from chapter 2, where 
the multilateral resistance terms 𝛱𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 are defined by equations 
(2.13) – (2.14): 
 
4.1  
 
  𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑌𝑗𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
(
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝛱𝑖𝑃𝑗
)
1−𝜎
𝜂𝑖𝑗 
ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = − ln𝑌𝑤 + ln𝑌𝑖 +ln𝑌𝑗
+ (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 − (1 − 𝜎) ln𝛱𝑖 − (1 −𝜎)ln  𝑃𝑗
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗⏟
=ln𝑛𝑖𝑗
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, Anderson and van Wincoop assume 
symmetrical trade costs, 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑗𝑖, which makes them able to solve the 
model in terms of observables (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). 
Then they use NLS estimation to obtain their results. By doing this they 
avoid log-linearization and exclusion of zero-observations in the 
regression. However, the assumption of symmetrical trade costs is quite 
strong, so I will therefore modify their approach. By using the PPML 
estimator discussed in chapter 2, I avoid the problem of zero-observa-
tions and heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, due to lack of bilateral NTB 
data as in ECORYS (2009a), I use Taylor approximations on the 
multilateral resistance terms as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2009). I will explain the data issue and introduce the Baier and 
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Bergstrand method shortly, but first it is necessary to specify the trade 
costs. 
Trade costs 
As bilateral trade costs, 𝜏𝑖𝑗, are not directly observable it is necessary to 
use observable proxies. As is frequently done the gravity literature, I 
use bilateral distance along with a number of dummy variables 
containing information on bilateral cultural and historical 
relationships as proxies. In addition to this, I add a dummy variable for 
RTAs, data on tariffs and an estimate of the ad-valorem tariff 
equivalents of NTBs. I use the standard functional form for the trade 
costs as in equation (2.15). Thus, trade costs are given by 
 
4.2 
𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜌
∙ 𝑡𝑗
𝜅 ∙ 𝜔𝑗
𝛼 
∙ 𝑒
[
𝑏1𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗+𝑏2(𝑅𝑇𝐴∙𝜔)𝑖𝑗+𝑏3(𝑅𝑇𝐴∙𝑡)𝑖𝑗+𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
+𝑏5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗+𝑏6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗+𝑏7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗+𝑏8𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗+𝑏9𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗
]
 
 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance between i and j, 𝑡𝑗  are tariffs imposed j, 𝜔𝑗 are 
the ad-valorem tariff equivalents of NTBs imposed by j and 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 is a 
dummy variable indicating whether i and j are fellow members of a 
trade agreement. Note that both tariffs and NTBs are denoted only with 
subscript j. This is because the data is taken from the Kee et al. (2009) 
dataset, which unfortunately only includes one-dimensional trade 
barrier data – the same problem faced by ECORYS (2009a). 
I have also included interaction terms between the RTA dummy 
variable and both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Note that since the RTA 
dummy is bilateral, this makes the interaction terms vary bilaterally as 
well. It is natural to expect that trade agreements will reduce the 
impact of trade barriers, but it is not certain how exports are affected 
differently by NTBs when the RTA dummy is active, relative to when it 
is inactive. The interaction terms might provide some insight on this, 
and a simple example using exports and NTBs only will illustrate 
(country subscripts are dropped for simplicity). 
4.3  𝑋 = 𝑎0+ 𝑎1𝑁𝑇𝐵 + 𝑎2𝑅𝑇𝐴 + 𝑎3(𝑁𝑇𝐵 ∙ 𝑅𝑇𝐴)  
In this simple case, the effect of NTBs on exports will be given by 
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑁𝑇𝐵
= 𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑅𝑇𝐴 . When there are no trade agreements (𝑅𝑇𝐴 = 0) we 
get  
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑁𝑇𝐵
= 𝑎1 , where 𝑎1 < 0  is expected. Now, if the countries in 
question are engaged in a trade agreement (𝑅𝑇𝐴 = 1), then 
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑁𝑇𝐵
=
𝑎1 + 𝑎3. The sign of 𝑎3 is not as straightforward to interpret. It affects 
the slope of the line in (4.3) with respect to NTBs. A negative sign on  𝑎3 
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means that each percentage point reduction in NTB tariff equivalents 
within a trade agreement (remember, 𝑅𝑇𝐴 = 1 ) will increase exports 
more than if 𝑅𝑇𝐴 = 0. Or, If a country within a trade agreement decides 
to deviate and impose a new NTB on its fellow members or to increase 
an old one (assuming for now that they are able to do so and get away 
with it), the county’s exports will drop more than it would if the country 
was not a member of a trade agreement.  
The interpretation of 𝑎2 is not straightforward either. Strictly, it 
measures the effect of RTA’s when NTBs are zero. However, this does 
not make much sense, economically speaking. It is more fruitful to 
consider the total effect of RTA’s: 
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑅𝑇𝐴
= 𝑎2 + 𝑎3𝑁𝑇𝐵. 
Finally, the last 6 variables in equation (4.3) are dummy variables 
controlling for historical and cultural relations. Contig indicates if the 
two countries share a border, Comlang indicates whether the two 
countries share official language, Colony indicates whether the two 
countries were ever in a colonial relationship, Comcol indicates if they 
have had the same colonizer after 1945, Col45 indicates whether a 
country pair have been in a colonial relationship after 1945 and Smctry 
indicates whether two countries ever have been the same country.  
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) – an alternative to fixed effects estimation 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the data used in the ECORYS 
(2009a) study had the same problem with one-dimensional NTB-data. 
They solved the problem by constructing interaction terms between the 
NTB cost equivalents with bilateral dummy variables. But as shown in 
the example above, this makes the interpretation of the coefficients a 
bit messy. I will try to avoid this in my estimation which means that I 
cannot use fixed effects.  
To tackle this problem, Baier and Bergstrand (2009) suggest a 
different approach. By using a first-order log-linear Taylor-series 
expansion of the multilateral resistance terms in equations (2.13) and 
(2.14) they arrive at the following expressions for the multilateral 
resistance terms 
  4.4 
ln𝛱𝑖 =∑
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
ln𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
−
1
2
∑ ∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
4.5 ln 𝑃𝑗 =∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
−
1
2
∑ ∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑗=1
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
which are analogous to (2.13) and (2.14) (Baier and Bergstrand (2009). 
To make their results comparable to Anderson and van Wincoop 
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(2003), Baier and Bergstrand assume symmetrical trade costs, but they 
stress that, for estimation, the multilateral resistance approximations 
in (4.4) and (4.5) are  “…effectively identical under symmetric or 
asymmetric bilateral trade costs” (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009 footnote 
5). Adding the terms yields 
4.6  
ln𝛱𝑖 + ln𝑃𝑗 =∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑖=1
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗∑
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
−∑ ∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑗=1
ln𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
This can be inserted into the log linearized version of the model in 
equation (4.1) to get: 
 4.7  
ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶⏟
− ln𝑌𝑤
+ ln𝑌𝑖 +ln𝑌𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   
 
 
where 
 
 
 4.8     
 
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
∗ = ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 −∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑖=1
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 −∑
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
+∑ ∑
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
𝑁
𝑗=1
ln𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) use the same dataset as Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) and get very similar results. They also do various 
Monte Carlo exercises and show that the multilateral resistance 
approximations give virtually identical coefficients compared to fixed 
effects and nonlinear least squares estimation. Next, I incorporate this 
into my model. Taking the logs of the trade costs in (4.2) yields: 
4.9  
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗 + 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗 +𝑏1𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗
+ 𝑏2(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝜔)𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏3(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
+ 𝑏5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗
+ 𝑏8𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏9𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗 
 
Furthermore, I follow Shepard (2013) and assume that 
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
=
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
=
1
𝑁
, i.e. 
that all countries have an equal share of world GDP. This assumption is 
quite strong, but it makes it possible to regard the terms in (4.8) as 
means, which simplifies calculations. Inserting (4.9) and 
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
=
𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑤
=
1
𝑁
 
Marcus Gjems Theie 48 
into (4.8) yields the expression for trade costs (see appendix A3 for the 
calculation): 
 
where the different terms are defined as follows: 
 
4.11  
ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ = ln𝑑𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 +
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
 
 
4.12 
ln 𝑡𝑗
∗ = ln 𝑡𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln 𝑡𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln 𝑡𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln 𝑡𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
 
 
4.13  
 
ln𝜔𝑗
∗ = ln𝜔𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝜔𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝜔𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln𝜔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
 
 
4.14  
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
 
 
4.15  
(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝜔)𝑖𝑗
∗ = (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝜔)𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝜔)𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙𝑁𝑗=1
𝜔)𝑖𝑗 +
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝜔)𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
 
4.16  
(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗
∗ = (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ (𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
The cultural and historical variables, Contigij
∗ , Comlangij
∗ , Comcolij
∗ ,
Colonyij
∗ , Col45ij
∗  and Smctryij
∗  are constructed in a similar manner, 
following the same pattern. To save space, I have moved these 
expressions to appendix A4.  
Putting it all together yields the following gravity equation, which 
controls for multilateral resistance while still allowing for country-
specific variation: 
4.10 
ln𝜏𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝜌 ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗
∗+ 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗
∗ + 𝑏1𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗
∗ +𝑏2(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙
𝜔)𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏3(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗ +
𝑏5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗ +𝑏6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏8𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗
∗ +
𝑏9𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗   
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4.17  
 
ln𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶 + ln𝑌𝑖 +ln𝑌𝑗 +(1 − 𝜎)[𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗
∗+
𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗
∗ + 𝑏1𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗
∗ +𝑏2(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝜔)𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏3(𝑅𝑇𝐴 ∙ 𝑡)𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗ +
𝑏5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗+𝑏6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝑏8𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗
∗ +
𝑏9𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ ] + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
Equation (4.17) is the econometric version on the Anderson and van 
Wincoop gravity model when using proxies for trade costs, and control-
ling for multilateral resistance through use of Taylor approximations 
according to Baier and Bergstrand (2009). 
PPML estimation 
If I were to follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009) I would estimate (4.17) 
using OLS. However, I wish to use PPML estimation to avoid the 
heteroskedasticity and zero-observation bias, as discussed in chapter 2. 
Therefore I will modify (4.17) in the regression by using exports instead 
of log of exports on the left hand side while keeping the right hand side 
variables in log form. This way of specifying the PPML-regression 
highly is convenient for interpretation of the results as it allows me to 
keep interpreting the coefficients as elasticities as in the log-log OLS 
model (Shepard, 2013). The dummy variables also have the same inter-
pretations. This way of specifying PPML-regressions of gravity models 
has become standard in the literature and is used in many papers, 
including Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Shepard (2013) and Egger and 
Larch (2011). However, the main inspiration comes from Francois and 
Manchin (2013) who use PPML estimation with Taylor approximations 
for multilateral resistance in their gravity estimation. 
Summing up the econometric approach 
Three important points emerge from the discussion so far. First, 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) emphasize the need to control for 
multilateral resistance. Second, since my variables of interest, i.e. 
tariffs and NTBs vary by country only, I cannot use fixed effects esti-
mation. Therefore, I follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and use a first-
order log-linear Taylor-series expansion of the multilateral resistance 
terms. Third, I eliminate the potential heteroskedasticity and selection 
biases from using log-linear OLS estimation by using the PPML esti-
mator as suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006).  
Data 
The dataset combines data on bilateral trade relations within five sec-
tors for 100 countries. The data is gathered from five separate sources 
and contains data on bilateral exports, the trade barriers faced by 
exporters (tariff as well as non-tariff barriers), trade agreements, GDP, 
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bilateral distances and a number of historical and cultural relations. 
The purpose of this section is to explain how the different data sources 
have been adapted and put together to make the final gravity dataset, 
and to discuss its strengths and limitations. 
Data on trade barriers 
The dataset on trade restrictiveness by Kee et al. (2009) is the point of 
departure for the final dataset as the main goal of my estimations is to 
estimate the effect of tariffs and NTBs on trade flows. Kee et al. (2009) 
have constructed a comprehensive dataset with trade barrier data on a 
six-digit level of product division (HS6) for 104 countries. The variables 
of interest in their dataset for my purposes are data on import tariffs 
and ad-valorem estimates of NTBs. Kee et al. (2009) define NTBs as 
price control measures, quantity restrictions and technical regulations 
(hereunder also health and hygiene regulations). This is an important 
contrast to ECORYS and CEPR, where quantity and price control 
measures are excluded from the definition (see chapter 3). In this sense 
the Kee et al. definition of NTBs is broader than the ECORYS definition.   
Using estimated tariff equivalents of NTBs is the same method used 
by CEPR in their study on TTIP. However, there are some crucial 
differences between the dataset by Kee et al. (2009) and the one used 
by CEPR. Recall that CEPR uses estimates of trade cost equivalents of 
NTBs from the ECORYS 2009 study12. For their study, ECORYS 
constructed a unique dataset based mainly on business surveys (see 
chapter 3). Kee. et al. (2009) use a different approach. They rely on 
tariff and NTB data from the TRAINS13 database. The NTB data in this 
database is gathered from a large number of sources. NTBs applied by 
countries are collected from national sources such as Ministries of 
Trade, Ministries of Agriculture etc. (UNCTAD, 2009). Data from the 
private sector is gathered from two different sources; (i) firm level 
surveys as in ECORYS and (ii) firms reporting NTBs they meet when 
exporting to a particular country on UNCTADs14 web-based portal 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Both these methods can be somewhat unsatisfactory 
as it leaves the question of who is reporting, what is reported, and who 
it is that answer the surveys. Custom delays and bad infrastructure, e.g. 
bad roads or communications in importing country, are an example of 
a trade barrier which may not be reported as frequently as e.g. import 
quotas or sanitary requirements. However, these trade barriers, 
particularly infrastructure, are important determinants of trade costs 
(Limão and Venables, 1999).  Also, as mentioned in chapter 2 it is 
                                                             
12  Note that Kee et al. (2009) calculate tariff equivalents and ECOYRS calculate trade-
cost equivalents.  
13  TRAINS: Trade Analysis and Information System 
14  UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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important to keep in mind that firms survey’s might also produce 
incomplete data, as it is not given that all NTBs facing a firm will be 
picked up by the survey. These arguments show how the TRAINS data-
base on NTBs might be incomplete, which is important to keep in mind 
when reviewing the results. 
Kee et al. (2009) use the NTB data from TRAINS to create a compre-
hensive dataset at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System of Trade 
Classification (HS-6). As mentioned in the previous section the data is 
constant across exporters for a given importer, i.e. it does not vary 
bilaterally. Kee et al. constructs NTBs as dummy variables; if product k 
in country i is subject to a NTB, then 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑘𝑖 = 1. This is contrary to 
ECORYS (2009a) who, based on their business survey, constructs a NTB 
index.  
The ad-valorem tariff equivalents of the NTB dummies are obtained, 
as in ECORYS (2009a), through gravity analysis. For each product, they 
estimate what a tariff would have to be to keep trade at the same level if 
the NTB was eliminated.  
Limitations due to the Kee et al. dataset 
A limitation in the Kee et al. (2009) dataset is that it is a cross section. 
This means that I am unable to use a panel dataset in the analysis. The 
data is gathered from whenever the most recent year data is available 
between 2000 and 2004. 15 They claim that more than half of the tariffs 
are from 2003 or 2004, while only three countries have data from 
2000. Of these, only two are included in my final dataset16.  
The NTB data is gathered over a larger time period; from 1992 to 
2004. This poses a potential problem as the removal of NTBs or 
creations of new NTBs might not be picked up. Furthermore, I am 
unable to analyze how NTBs have evolved relative to tariffs over time. It 
would have been ideal to have better data, so I could construct a panel 
and see whether the relative importance of tariffs and NTBs have 
changed over time, as is argued by e.g. the World Bank (2012). There 
are two main reasons for why a panel might show signs of this. First, 
since 2004 there has been more integration of the world into trade 
agreements, and given the nature of NTBs, it is more difficult to 
eliminate these in trade agreements relative to tariffs. Hence, most 
trade agreements have better cover of tariffs than of NTBs, as argued by 
                                                             
15  Although the paper was published in 2009 the dataset was constructed and made 
available for download on the World Bank website in 2005. Therefore the data is 
from 2004 and before. 
16  Kazakhstan and Peru are included. Egypt is excluded due to lack of export data.  
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Estevadeordal et al. (2009), and it is natural to assume that more tariff 
than non-tariff barriers have been removed in recent years.   
Second, it might be the case that countries have used NTBs as 
substitutes for tariffs as trade agreements have forced tariff levels 
down. Kee et al. (2009) provides some evidence of this in the paper 
accompanying their dataset. They regress NTBs on tariffs and discover 
a negative relationship, indicating that NTBs act as substitutes for 
tariffs when controlling for both product and country specific effects 
(Kee et al., 2009 table 2). The result is highly significant, but small in 
magnitude, with an elasticity of -0.003, meaning that a one percent 
decrease in tariffs will lead to a 0.003 percent increase in the ad-
valorem tariff equivalent of NTBs. If this is true we would expect to see 
NTB levels increase relative to tariffs. 
Countries in the final dataset  
Since data on tariffs and NTBs are crucial for the regression analysis, 
the Kee et al. dataset limits the number of includable countries. See 
appendix A5 for a complete list of the countries that are included in the 
final dataset. Note that the final number only amounts to 100 
countries. This is due to lack of export data for some countries (more on 
this below). Note also that most EU and European countries, as well as 
USA, are included17. Also, most other countries in Europe, the US and 
the largest economies in Asia, Africa, North and South America are 
included. 
100 countries is an adequate number for gravity analysis18. It would 
be preferable, however, to be able to include more. While the largest 
economies in the world and the most important trade partners for both 
the EU and the US are included, many smaller economies are excluded. 
In some lower income countries or countries with lower level of 
transparency, statistical databases might not be as easily accessible 
and it might be harder to administer the distribution of firm level 
surveys, or to establish systems for reporting trade barriers. This gives 
rise to a potential selection bias as the exclusion cannot be said to be 
totally random. As an illustration of this, the mean GDP (measured in 
million USD) is 564.3 in the Kee et al. dataset and 213.3 in the original 
data from the World Development Index (WDI), which contains GDP 
data on the whole world. In other words, excluding countries due to 
limitations in Kee et al. (2009) raises the average GDP by more than 
                                                             
17  Cyprus, Slovakia, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein and Malta are the only excluded 
countries from the EU and the EEA  
18  FO use 126 and ECORYS use 40. 
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half. While a formal discussion of this is beyond the scope my thesis, it 
is important to keep this potential bias in mind.  
Sectors 
Kee et al. (2009) provide high level of disaggregation in their trade 
barrier data. For my purpose, such a level of detail is not necessary.  
However, it is desirable with some form of disaggregation as it can be 
interesting to look at how NTBs affect sectors asymmetrically. Therefore 
I have made use of the high level of disaggregation in the original 
dataset and divided the tariff data into five main sectors. Table 4.1 
gives a summary of these sectors and how they correspond to the HS 
1996 product classification system. The classification is taken from 
Melchior et al. (2014). 
 
Unfortunately, the data provided by Kee et al. is incomplete when it 
comes to oil and gas. In the dataset there is only tariff and NTB data on 
gas (HS 2711), not on crude oil (HS 2709) or crude oil products (HS 
2710). Therefore, I have decided to exclude the oil and gas sector from 
the analysis. 
  
Table 4.1: Sector classification 
Sector no. Sector name Content keywords HS Chapters 
1 Agriculture Agriculture and seafood 
 
1-24 
2 Oil and Gas  
 
2709-2711 
3 Heavy Industries Chemicals and plastic, metals and 
other minerals 
25, 26, 27 ex. oil and gas, 
28-39, 72, 7401-7413, 75, 
7601-14, 78-81 
4 Light Industries Textile goods, shoes, leather 
goods and other industries 
 
40-71, 73, 7414-19, 7615-
16, 82, 83, 91-97 
5 Machinery and transport 
equipment 
 
84-90 
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Other data sources  
 
Data on bilateral trade 
Data on bilateral trade is taken from the UN COMTRADE database. I use 
data on bilateral exports on sector level from 2004 in accordance with 
the HS 1996 sector classification in Table 4.1. There are some excep-
tions however. Due to lack of 2004 data for Nepal, Nigeria and the 
Central African Republic data on these countries is from 2003. For 
Bhutan there is data for 2005 only. A total of four countries from the 
Kee et al (2009) dataset are excluded from the final dataset due to lack 
of data on exports; Chad, Lao PDR, Equatorial Guinea and Egypt.  
 
CEPII gravity data 
The French CEPII19 institute has published a dataset containing many 
of the variables and dummies commonly used in gravity estimations. 
The primary variable of interest for my purposes is the measure of 
bilateral distances between countries’ capitols. Additionally, there are 
bilateral dummy variables on cultural and historical relations as 
explained above. 
 
Data on GDP 
For GDP data I have used the World Development Index of 2005. GDP 
is measured in current USD. 
 
Data on regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
I also use bilateral dummy variables indicating whether given a pair of 
importers and exporters are partners in a trade agreement. I use data 
for 2004 only. This data is constructed by José de Sousa (2011) and are 
gathered from three different sources. One potential issue is that I use 
trade data for 2004. In May 2004 the EU was expanded by ten 
countries. It might be that the effects of the expansion are not fully 
accounted for in the trade data for 2004. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for the main variables to be used 
in the estimations. Some interesting points emerge. The average tariff 
barrier in the dataset is 10 percent across all sectors20. This is lower 
than the estimated ad-valorem tariff equivalent for NTBs which average 
13.8 percent in the data. Note also that the standard deviation on tariffs 
is much lower compared to the standard deviation on NTBs. This has 
two implications. First, the summary data indicate that NTBs are a 
                                                             
19  Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales 
20  Excluding oil and gas as there is limited data on trade barriers in these sectors. 
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bigger problem for international trade flows than tariffs. This highlights 
the importance of including regulations on NTBs for current and future 
trade agreements such as TTIP. This argument is also put forth by both 
IFO and CEPR. Second, the standard deviations imply that NTBs are 
more unevenly spread and that their effect on trade flows might vary 
substantially across products and sectors. A more thorough discussion 
on this follows below.  
I have also included summary statistics for the original dummy 
variable on NTBs used by Kee. et al (2009) as the basis for their 
estimations of NTB tariff equivalents. This shows that 37.6 percent of 
the products in the dataset are subject to a NTB. Once again this 
highlights the importance of NTBs in world trade.  
Table 4.2 shows that of the 9900 bilateral trade relations, 17 
percent are fellow members of a trade agreement.  21 I have also 
included summary statistics for a RTA dummy restricted to the EU and 
EEA, NAFTA and ANZCERTA trade agreements22.  
Note that five percent of the bilateral trade relations in the dataset 
are covered by these trade agreements. They are included based on a 
somewhat ad hoc assumption that they are the world’s most efficient at 
reducing trade barriers amongst their members. However, in recent 
years many comprehensive trade agreements have been signed. In a 
meta-analysis on the effects of RTAs on bilateral trade flows in gravity 
studies Cipollina and Slavatici (2010) find that the effect of RTAs 
“…tend to get larger as for more recent years, which could be a 
consequence of the evolution from  “shallow” to “deep” trade 
agreements” (pp. 77). I argue that since I use somewhat old data (from 
2004), the agreements covered by the restricted RTA dummy can 
indeed be considered among the most efficient at reducing trade 
barriers in the sample.   
                                                             
21 N countries gives N(N-1) bilateral country pairs. With 100 countries: 100*99 = 9900. 
22  EU (2004): Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Slovakia, Luxemburg and Malta. The last 
four are excluded due to data restrictions. 
 EEA: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein is excluded due 
to data restrictions.  
 NAFTA: Canada, Mexico and USA 
 ANZERTA: Australia and New Zealand 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Log of exporter GDP 18.2237 1.9805 13.4627 23.2310 
Log of importer GDP 18.15406 2.0059 13.4627 23.2310 
Tariffs 0.1002 0.1008 0 0.7330 
NTB dummy 0.3759 0.4035 0 1 
NTB tariff equivalent 0.1381 0.1629 0 0.7445 
RTA dummy 0.1710 0.3765 0 1 
Restricted  
RTA Dummy 
0.0516 0.2213 0 1 
Log of distance 8.6252 0.8552 4.3943 9.8920 
Contiguity  0.0339 0.1810 0 1 
Common colonizer  0.0583 0.2344 0 1 
Common language  0.1423 0.3493 0 1 
Colony post 1945 0.0119 0.1084 0 1 
Same country 0.0116 0.1072 0 1 
Summary statistics excludes oil and gas sectors. Total observations: 30519.  
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The efficiency of these trade agreements is to some extent supported by 
the findings in Estevadeordal et al. (2009) and Cipollina and Salavatici 
(2010). However, I wish to stress that the restriction on the RTA 
dummy is somewhat ad hoc, which might influence the results, but 
that a thorough discussion on the relative efficiency of existing RTAs is 
beyond the scope of my thesis. Note that when use I the term efficiency 
in association with trade agreements in the following, it refers to the 
extent the trade agreement is able to reduce trade barriers, and thus 
induce trade amongst the member countries.  
The last five rows of table 4.2 show summary statistics for the various 
historical and cultural dummy variables. The common language 
variable is by far the most prominent one. On average more than 14 
percent of the country pairs share a common official language. The 
remaining historical and cultural variables are less prominent with 
means varying between 1 and 5 percent.  
 
Sector-level summary statistics 
As mentioned above, there is reason to believe that NTBs and tariffs are 
unevenly spread across sectors. Therefore I also include disaggregated 
summary statistics for selected variables in table 4.3. Here, the data 
have been divided according to table 4.1, excluding the oil and gas 
sector. The agricultural sector is subject to the highest trade protection 
both in terms of tariffs and NTBs; over 60 percent of agricultural 
products are subject to a NTB and the estimated tariff equivalents of 
NTBs are higher than the observed tariffs. 
This is also the case for the heavy industries sector. Note that in this 
case the difference between estimated NTB tariff equivalents and 
observed tariffs are very large. This can be taken as an indication that 
Table 4.3: Summary statistics for selected variables on sector level 
 
 Sector 
 Agriculture 
 
Heavy industries 
 
Light industries 
 Machinery and  
Transport 
equipment 
Variable Mean 
St. 
dev. 
 
Mean 
St. 
dev. 
 
Mean 
St. 
dev. 
 
Mean 
St. 
dev. 
Tariffs 0.1783 0.1236 
 
0.0407 0.0564 
 
0.1178 0.0905 
 
0.0627 0.0550 
NTB 
dummy 
0.6275 0.3539 
 
0.4316 0.4843 
 
0.2689 0.3053 
 
0.1954 0.3106 
NTB tariff 
equivalents 
0.2214 0.1377 
 
0.1872 0.2197 
 
0.0808 0.0965 
 
0.0726 0.1215 
 # of obs. 7385  7281  8163  7690 
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this sector is most prone to substituting tariffs with NTBs. In the two 
remaining sectors, NTB means are significantly lower at 8 and 7 
percent. Also, the difference between NTBs and tariffs are smaller in 
these sectors.  
TTIP summary statistics  
Table 4.4 is a version of table 4.3 including TTIP members only (i.e. EU 
and US). Here, aggregated summary statistics and exports for all 
sectors are included as well to give an impression of the relative trade 
volume. Observe that all the four sectors reported show substantial 
trade. It is also evident that the trade falls with the level of trade 
protection. In the machinery and transport equipment sector, trade is 
largest, while tariffs and estimated NTB tariff equivalents are very low 
with means around one percent. 
In agriculture the trade barriers are high. An average of 75.5 percent of 
all products is subject to a NTB giving an estimated 30 percent tariff 
equivalent in this sector. The tariffs are also very high compared to the 
other sectors. Consequently, transatlantic trade in this sector is lower 
than in the others. This shows the potential inherited in a transatlantic 
trade agreement for the agricultural sector. According to IFO (2013a), 
agriculture will be the sector where there is most to gain in TTIP. 
Looking at table 4.4 this becomes obvious; there is huge potential in 
lowering agricultural trade barriers. However, whether this is realistic 
is not clear. Agriculture is an area where the EU and US do not 
necessarily agree; an example is the case of Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMO) where there is much debate around where to draw 
the line (NFD, 2014). 
There is a clear distinction between the summary statistics in table 4.4 
and the CEPR data. The average NTB tariff equivalent is 13.1 percent 
while the average is 22.5 percent for goods trade in the CEPR study 
(CEPR, 2013). Furthermore, table 4.4 shows that tariffs and NTBs are 
low in the machinery and transport sector, while this is one of the 
sectors where CEPR predicts the largest gains from TTIP. This might be 
an aggregation issue as CEPR have more sectors, or it might have to do 
with the broader definition of NTBs in Kee et al. (2009). In any case, 
this shows how unstable NTB data can be, and how difficult it is to get 
good data. 
  
Non-tariff barriers, trade integration and the gravity model 59 
 
 
Correlation matrices 
Table 4.5 contains correlations between selected variables. Correla-
tions only show the linear association between the variables, and 
cannot be used to make any conclusions. For this, formal estimation is 
needed. However, it is useful to examine the correlation matrix to get a 
sense of the general behavior in the data.  
 
  
 
Table 4.4: Summary statistics for selected variables on sector level, TTIP only 
 
 Sector   
 Agriculture 
 
Heavy industries 
 
Light industries 
 Machinery and  
Transport 
equipment 
 
All 
Variable Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean St. dev. 
 
Mean 
Tariffs 0.1296 0.0510 
 
0.0038 0.0104 
 
0.0330 0.0278 
 
0.0166 0.0264 
 
0.0458 
NTB 
dummy 
0.7556 0.2592 
 
0.2041 0.3913 
 
0.3382 0.1808 
 
0.0363 0.6820 
 
0.3335 
NTB tariff 
equivalents 
0.3066 0.1250 
 
0.0967 0.1825 
 
0.1112 0.0684 
 
0.0102 0.0190 
 
0.1312 
Exports 418.9 977.6 
 
1302.6 3001.0 
 
962.2 1937.7 
 
2398.7 5873.8 
 
1270.6 
 
Observations 
420 
 
420 
 
420 
 
420 
 
1680 
N 
B: exports measured in current million USD 
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Overall the correlations in table 4.5 are in line with intuition; there is a 
negative linear association between exports and both tariffs and NTBs, 
and a positive linear association between exports and the RTA dummy. 
Note that in panel B the RTA dummy variable is restricted to the EU and 
EEA, NAFTA and ANZCERTA agreements only. In this case the correla-
tion between exports and tariffs is stronger. Note also that the unre-
stricted dummy variable in panel A show a weak positive correlation 
with NTBs, while in panel B the correlation is negative and larger in 
absolute value, i.e. there is a reversal of the direction and a strengthen-
ing of the linear relationship between the RTA dummy and NTBs when 
 
Table 4.5: Correlation matrix on selected variables  
 
Panel A: using the unrestricted RTA dummy 
 RTA dummy Exports Tariffs NTBs 
 
RTA dummy 
 
1 - - - 
 
Exports 
 
0.0998 1 - - 
 
Tariffs 
 
-0.0652 -0.605 1 - 
 
NTBs 
 
0.0077 -0.0249 0.1713 1 
 
Panel B: using the restricted RTA dummy 
 
Restricted 
RTA dummy 
Exports Tariffs NTBs 
 
Restricted 
RTA dummy 
 
1 - - - 
 
Exports 
 
0.1504 1 - - 
 
Tariffs 
 
-0.1211 -0.605 1 - 
 
NTBs 
 
-0.0103 -0.0249 0.1713 1 
 
NB: the correlations are based on the original formatting of the data from Kee et al. 
(2009), i.e. I do not use applied tariffs and NTBs here like in the regressions. This is 
because there is no need to have the data on tariffs and NTBs in log form. When using 
log of applied tariffs and NTBs instead however, the signs all stay the same and the 
correlations are very similar in magnitude.  
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restricting the RTA dummy. Again it is important to stress that no 
conclusions can be made from correlations alone. In particular, the 
correlations must not be taken as causal arguments.  
Estimation results 
Main regression results 
The results are presented in table 4.6 which contains five different esti-
mations. I use Stata version 13.1 for all my estimations. Columns (i) 
and (ii) contain my main regression results. Here the dependent 
variables inherited in the trade cost term from equation (4.2) corre-
spond to equation (4.11) – (4.22) and thus include Taylor 
approximations of the multilateral trade cost terms, following Baier 
and Bergstrand (2009). Also, to combat the issue of heteroskedasticity 
and zero-observations, columns (i) and (ii) are estimated using PPML-
estimation. Note that even though the dependent variable in columns 
(i) and (ii) are exports rather than log of exports the dependent 
variables are still specified as logarithms (except for the dummy 
variables), as discussed above. 
A note on interpretation of the coefficients with multilateral resistance 
The regressions in columns (i) and (ii) in table 4.6 are based on the 
Taylor approximation of the multilateral resistance terms as in Baier 
and Bergstrand (2009). This changes their interpretation somewhat. 
The coefficients now account for both the direct effect of a change in an 
independent variable for a bilateral relation i and j, and the indirect 
effect of a change in the same variable between country i and all other 
countries, as well as with j and all other countries. For instance, the 
RTA dummy variable accounts for the effect of trading with a fellow 
member of a trade agreement, but it also accounts for the effect of other 
trading partners being part of a trade agreement. This could have a 
negative effect for the exports of a country, as it will be faced with 
relatively less demand if other trading partners are engaged in trade 
agreements. This is the nature of the multilateral resistance concept, 
but when using fixed effects estimation, as in e.g. ECORYS (2009) the 
indirect effect is soaked up by the country dummies. For all my results 
the direct effect dominates, so the coefficients can be interpreted 
straightforward, but the indirect effects might alter the magnitude of 
the effects. 
Other empirical specifications 
Columns (iii) and (iv) are estimated using fixed effects with PPML and 
OLS estimation. I have also included estimation of the naïve gravity 
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equation in column (v), i.e.  ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶 + 𝛼ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 +
𝛾ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗, where the only proxy for trade costs is bilateral distance, 
and multilateral resistance is not controlled for. As discussed above, 
the estimations in column (iii) – (v) cannot be used to discuss the 
impact of the NTBs in my dataset, and are included only for robustness 
and comparison with the literature. Looking at the different methods of 
estimation in table 3.7 some interesting points can be made. Observe 
the different pattern when using PPML estimations compared to OLS. 
First of all the coefficients on GDP are strikingly different in column (i) 
and (iv). OLS regressions of gravity equations tend to show the same 
pattern of a higher value on the coefficient on GDP (Silva and Tenreyro, 
2006). It is also a familiar result that the true coefficients on GDP are 
close to 1, as discussed in chapter 2. Both these observations are non-
existent when using the PPML estimator. As in Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006), the GDP estimates in column (i) and (ii) are between 0.7 and 
0.8 and quite similar in magnitude.  
Another point, also put forth by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), is that 
the coefficient on distance drops dramatically when using the PPML 
estimator. This leads us to conclude that geographical distance is not as 
important a trade barrier as previously thought. Lastly, and also in 
accordance with Silva and Tenreyro, fewer of the coefficients on 
historical and cultural linkages are statistically significant.  
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Table 4.6: Regression results 
  
 Method of estimation 
 PPML PPML, fixed 
effects 
OLS, fixed effects OLS 
 (i) (ii) 
 
(iii) (iv) (v) 
Independent 
variables: 
Dependent variable: 
Exports 
Dependent variable: 
log of exports 
Log of exporter 
GDP 
 
 
0.7829** 
(0.000) 
0.7760** 
(0.000) 
- - 1.2605** 
(0.000) 
Log of importer 
GDP 
 
 
0.7836** 
(0.000) 
0.7806** 
(0.000) 
- - 0.8961** 
(0.000) 
Log of tariffs 
 
 
-3.348** 
(0.000) 
-3.8620** 
(0.000) 
- - - 
Log of NTBs 
 
 
-2.405 ** 
(0.000) 
-2.2400** 
(0.000) 
- - - 
RTA tariff  
Interaction 
 
-1.6370 
(0.251) 
0.6005 
(0.495) 
- - - 
RTA NTB  
interaction 
 
-0.5223 
(0.290) 
-1.7512** 
(0. 000) 
- - - 
RTA dummy 
 
 
0.7692** 
(0.000) 
0.4499** 
(0.001) 
0.9003** 
(0.000) 
0.5536** 
(0.000) 
- 
Log of distance 
 
 
-0.5403** 
(0.000) 
-0.6494** 
(0.000) 
-0.5148** 
(0.000) 
-1.3613** 
(0.000) 
-1.3851** 
(0.000) 
Contiguity dummy 
 
 
0.1806 
(0.328) 
0.2120 
(0.204) 
0.3359** 
(0.001) 
0.4425** 
(0.004) 
- 
Colony dummy 
 
 
0.0261 
(0.888) 
-0.0791 
(0.670) 
0.1520 
(0.278) 
0.4380** 
(0.002) 
- 
Common colonizer 
dummy 
 
0.0014 
(0.998) 
-0.1360 
(0.824) 
0.7137** 
(0.000) 
1.0543** 
(0.000) 
- 
Common language 
dummy 
 
0.1245 
(0.500) 
0.1799 
(0.323) 
0.0756 
(0.485) 
0.6141** 
(0.000) 
- 
Colony post 1945 
dummy 
 
0.9665** 
(0.000) 
1.0593** 
(0.000) 
0.9410** 
(0.000) 
1.0543** 
(0.000) 
- 
Same country  
Dummy 
 
1.264** 
(0.001) 
1.3690** 
(0.003) 
0.1742 
(0.334) 
0 .5199* 
(0.035) 
- 
Constant term -6.8514** 
(0.003) 
-4.1478* 
(0.019) 
5.1206** 
(0.000) 
8.8037** 
(0.000) 
-20.042** 
(0.000) 
R2 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.68 0.58 
Observations 30519 30519 30519 30517 30517 
RTA dummy: Full Restricted Full Full - 
** and * denotes significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. P-values are reported in the parenthesis. I use robust 
standard errors as is standard in the gravity literature (Shepard, 2013). 
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All in all it is evident that the estimation results are sensitive to the 
estimation method. Using the PPML gives more reliable results as they 
allow for both heteroskedasticity and zero-trade flows. For this reason, 
the PPML-estimator has become the workhorse estimator for gravity 
equations (Shepard, 2013). Furthermore, the results in table 4.6 
indicate that my dataset behaves as expected relative what is common 
in the literature according to e.g. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Head 
and Mayer (2014). 
Discussion of the results 
Tariff and NTB results 
The coefficients on tariffs and NTBs in column (i) are both large in 
magnitude, negative and highly significant. As expected, exports are 
highly sensitive to protective measures like tariffs and NTBs. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the elasticity on tariffs is larger than the elasticity on 
NTBs. However, it is important to stress that this does not mean that my 
results violate the argument that NTBs are more important trade 
barriers that tariffs. The coefficients on NTBs and tariffs in table 4.6 are 
elasticities and do not contain any information on the relative 
importance of either NTBs or tariffs. Furthermore, as shown above, 
tariff levels are relatively low, so the possibility for tariff reductions is 
limited, while NTB levels are higher and the scope for reductions is 
larger. Therefore, it is likely that there is more potential for trade 
increases due to NTB reductions, as is argued by both IFO and CEPR. 
Another reason for the larger coefficient on tariffs relative to NTBs in 
table 4.6 could be that the indirect effect through multilateral 
resistance terms is larger for NTBs than for tariffs. Since tariffs are more 
discriminatory, as argued in the previous chapter, it is likely that 
exports from i to j will increase more if tariffs rather than NTBs are 
reduced between them, since this reduction will concern i and j only. 
On the other hand, if NTBs are reduced between i and j, this may 
implicitly reduce NTBs between all i and j’s trading partners through 
the spillover effects. Thus, bilateral trade between i and j will be lower 
relative to what it would have been with an equal tariff reduction since 
frictions between all trading partners of i and j are controlled for 
through multilateral resistance.  
In any case, it is clear from the results that there are gains to be made 
from both tariff and NTB reductions. Therefore, if TTIP eliminates tariffs 
only it can still be called a success. This is confirmed by the limited 
scenarios in both TTIP and CEPR, at least for member countries (see 
Non-tariff barriers, trade integration and the gravity model 65 
table 3.2 and 3.3), although the effects are smaller than in the 
comprehensive scenarios with NTB reductions as well. 
RTA results 
The results in column (i) of table 4.6 have some interesting 
implications relating to the discussion of the effect of trade agreements. 
First of all, note that the impact of trading with a member of a free trade 
agreement is highly significant and positive. Exports will (on average) 
be about 76 percent higher if exporting to a fellow member of a trade 
agreement. This observation lines up with the standard result in the 
literature. Head and Mayer (2014) conduct a meta-analysis of various 
policy dummies often used in gravity papers. Based on 257 indepen-
dent studies they report an average RTA coefficient of 0.59, albeit with 
a high standard deviation of 0.5. Another meta-analysis is performed 
by Cipollina and Salvatici (2010). They find that the estimated effect 
ranges from 40 – 65 percent depending on the methods used. 
Secondly, the coefficients on both interaction terms are not signifi-
cantly different from zero, with high p-values at 0.251 and 0.290 for 
tariffs and NTBs interaction terms respectively. Building on the 
interpretation example from equation (4.3), this gives very little insight 
as to how the RTAs affect the impact of NTBs on trade flows.  
Restricted RTA dummy 
One possibility is that the effects of more efficient trade agreements are 
diluted by more inefficient ones, and therefore the average effect on the 
interaction term shown in the regression in column (i) is uncertain. To 
check this, I run a separate regression where I restrict the RTA dummy 
to the EU and EEA, NAFTA and ANZCERTA, which I assume to be 
relatively efficient at reducing trade barriers, as discussed above. The 
result of the regression using the restricted RTA dummy is shown in 
column (ii). Apart from using the restricted RTA dummy, the regression 
is identical to the one in column (i).  
In this case the coefficient on the interaction between RTAs and NTBs is 
now highly significant and negative. This implies that when two 
countries i and j are fellow members of one of the RTAs covered by the 
restricted RTA dummy, an increase in the NTBs imposed on i by j will 
reduce i’s export to j by more than if i and j were not tied together in 
one of these RTAs. In other words, RTA members are punished rela-
tively more than non-members for enforcing NTBs within the agree-
ment. Or, on the other hand, if these trade agreements manage to 
reduce NTB levels further, every percentage decrease will result in a 
larger increase in exports than would be the case outside these 
agreements. Thus it seems that trade agreements not only reduce NTBs, 
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but they increase the effect of reducing them – at least within more 
efficient trade agreements, i.e. the ones covered by the restricted RTA 
dummy in my sample. The same pattern cannot be seen for tariffs; the 
coefficient on the interaction between tariffs and RTAs is still not 
significantly different from zero in column (ii) (the p-value has actually 
increased). 
Another interesting result in column (ii) is that the coefficient on the 
RTA dummy, while still being positive, is much smaller in magnitude 
compared to the coefficient in column (i). One possible explanation for 
this is that the indirect effect through the multilateral resistance terms 
is stronger in this case. Since only 5 percent of the bilateral relations in 
the sample are covered by these trade agreements (see table 4.2), most 
countries stand outside. Since the gravity model measures the average 
effect of RTAs on exports, and in this case the average bilateral relation 
is not a member of the RTAs in question, the result in column (ii) 
indicates that it is more severe for countries to stand outside these 
trade agreements than the trade agreements in column (i). 
Another important result emerging from the results in column (ii) is 
related to the discussion on the two TTIP studies in the previous 
chapter. The changes in the coefficients when restricting the RTA 
dummy provides the basis for a critique against the IFO study on TTIP. 
It proves that the average effect of trade agreements is dependent on 
which trade agreements that are inherited in the dummy. By assuming 
that the tariff and NTB reductions will equal the average of all existing 
trade agreements they are losing the ability to make any statements 
regarding effects of different levels of depth in the agreements ability to 
reduce trade frictions.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to discuss how the gravity model is used to account 
for the presence of NTBs in world trade, and how different methods 
affect the results. This is discussed through how the model is employed 
differently in the studies by CEPR and IFO that try to predict the effects 
of a trade agreement between the EU and US. I have also run my own 
gravity regression using a unique dataset to further supplement the 
discussion.  
Overall, the thesis confirms that NTBs are a substantial friction to trade. 
My regressions estimate that an average decrease in NTBs of one 
percent will increase average bilateral trade with 2.4 percent, when 
controlling for multilateral resistance. Furthermore, the data shows 
that the average estimated ad-valorem tariff equivalent of NTBs in the 
sample is 13.8, which is 3.8 percentage points larger than the average 
observed tariff, and that 37.6 percent of the products in the sample is 
subject to a NTB. Thus, I argue that the success of a transatlantic trade 
agreement – or any trade agreements for that matter – to a large extent 
will hinge on the ability to reduce non-tariff barriers.  
Both CEPR and IFO confirm this statement, and emphasize NTB 
reductions their studies. However, there are significant differences in 
their findings, particularly regarding the magnitude of TTIP’s impact. 
This can be explained, at least in part, by how they utilize the gravity 
equation to account for NTBs. The CEPR study relies mainly on a busi-
ness survey on transatlantic NTBs, which are calculated into ad-
valorem trade cost equivalents using the gravity model. These 
estimates are then used in a CGE model to predict the results. In other 
words, they only use the gravity equation to obtain data on NTBs which 
then are used in the CGE modelling. However, since NTBs plays such an 
important role in their study, the specification of the gravity model still 
plays a vital role. In the IFO study, the gravity model is used more 
directly. Here, the problem of NTB data shortage is avoided by assum-
ing that the effects of TTIP can be calculated from the average effect of 
existing trade agreements. They compare two gravity estimations; one 
where a simulated TTIP agreement is in place, and one where it is not. 
The simulated TTIP scenario is based on the estimated effects of 
existing RTAs. 
Both methods have their weaknesses. With the CEPR method there are 
structural issues regarding how NTBs are defined in the survey and 
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whether one can trust that the respondents’ answers reflect actual NTB 
levels. IFO avoids this as their average effect will include average NTB 
reductions in existing trade agreements, as well as average tariff 
reductions. Therefore, they do not need explicit data on NTBs. How-
ever, their study is severely limited as their method hinders them in 
being explicit about different scenarios of NTB reductions within TTIP. 
The two TTIP studies demonstrate how the gravity model can be used 
in very different ways to account for the presence of NTBs. It is my 
opinion that the CEPR method of using estimated ad-valorem trade cost 
equivalents is superior, at least for the purpose of predicting the 
outcome of a transatlantic trade agreement, as it allows for flexibility in 
terms of NTB reduction.  
To further discuss the presence of NTBs and to provide an alternative to 
the CEPR and IFO studies, I have constructed an independent dataset 
and run a separate regression. I base the data upon the dataset 
compiled by Kee et al (2009) who have made a comprehensive dataset 
with estimations of ad-valorem tariff equivalents of NTBs. The data con-
firm many of the points made by both IFO and CEPR; transatlantic 
NTBs are high, and consistently larger than tariffs in nearly all sectors. 
Furthermore, there are significant gains to be made from reducing 
NTBs, and I find that this effect increases within efficient trade agree-
ments, i.e. the ones covered by the restricted RTA dummy in my 
sample. My regressions also show that there still are significant gains to 
be made from reducing tariff barriers. This is also evident from looking 
at the data, which shows that transatlantic as well as worldwide tariffs 
still are present. This means that if TTIP fails at reducing NTBs it can 
still be called a success, at least to some extent, as there are gains to be 
made from tariff reductions alone. Both CEPR and IFO confirm this, 
although the gains are substantially smaller than in the more ambitious 
scenarios where NTBs are removed as well.  
Further, my regressions show that when using the restricted RTA 
dummy, where less efficient trade agreements are neglected, the results 
change. This shows that an “average” effect of existing trade agree-
ments, as is used by IFO, hinges on which agreements are included in 
the sample. The IFO report is not clear on which trade agreements they 
include, or why they assume that TTIP will be affected according to the 
average effect of these particular agreements.  
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Appendix 
A1 Deriving the CES demand function 
 
Multiplying through the first order condition (2.8) with 𝑐𝑖𝑗 gives 
A1.1  
 
𝜆𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗 = [∑ 𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
𝑁
𝑖=1
∙ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
(𝜎−1)/𝜎
]
1/(𝜎−1)
𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
𝑐𝑖𝑗
(𝜎−1)/𝜎
 
 
 
Then, summing over all i's: 
 
A1.2  
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Then, inserting 𝜆 from equation (A1.1), cancelling out terms and 
rearranging yield: 
     
A1.3 
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖 =
𝑌𝑗𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
𝑐𝑖𝑗
−1/𝜎
∑ 𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜎−1/𝜎𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
Raise both sides to the power of –𝜎, then multiply by 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖  and  finally 
rearrange again to get: 
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A1.4 (𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖)
1−𝜎
=
𝑌𝑗
−𝜎𝑐𝑖𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖
[∑ 𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜎−1/𝜎𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
−𝜎 
 
Sum over all i's: 
A1.5 ∑ (𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖)
1−𝜎𝑁
𝑖=1
=
𝑌𝑗
−𝜎∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
⏞        
=𝑌𝑗
∑ 𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜎−1/𝜎𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
Define the price index of country j as Pj = [∑ (τijpiβi)
1−σN
i=1 ]
1/(1−σ)
: 
 
A1.6  
 
∑ 𝛽𝑖
(1−𝜎)/𝜎
𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝜎−1/𝜎
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
𝑌𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎 
 
Inserting this back into (A1.4): 
A1.7 (𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖)
1−𝜎
=
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖
𝑌𝑗
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎  
 
Recall from chapter 2 that the nominal value of exports from i to j is 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗. Inserting (A1.7) into this expression yields the demand 
for i goods by j consumers: 
 
A1.8  
 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 =
(𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖)
1−𝜎
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎 𝑌𝑗 
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A2 The Bergstrand, Egger and Larch gravity model 
This specification of the gravity model is based on the Dixit-Stiglitz-
Krugman framework (Dixit and Stieglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1979 and 
1980). There is a single industry with monopolistic competitive market, 
increasing returns to scale in production and labor as the only input 
factor (MC-IR model). This leads each firm to produce a unique variety 
of the industry good. Consumers are assumed to follow the same CES 
utility structure as in the Anderson and van Wincoop model with the 
additional assumption that preferences are determined by a “love for 
variety”.  To simplify the derivation it is assumed that all firms within 
each country are symmetrical so that the equilibrium prices are 
equalized and each variety is consumed in equal amounts.   
Consumers 
Let 𝑛𝑖  be the number of varieties of the good produced in i. The utility 
function of a consumer in j is: 
 
A2.1  𝑈𝑗 = [∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗
(𝜎−1)/𝜎
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
𝜎/(𝜎−1)
 
 
Note that compared to equation (2.5) the only difference is that the 
exogenous preference parameter,  𝛽𝑖
1−𝜎/𝜎
, is replaced by the 
endogenous number of varieties 𝑛𝑖 , i.e. the number of firms. Assuming 
the same structure of trade costs and prices as before, consumers 
maximize (A2.1) subject to the budget constraint: 
 
A2.2  
𝑌𝑗 =∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑖𝑗 
 
This yields the demand for each variety: 
A.3 𝑐𝑖𝑗 =  
(𝑝𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗)
−𝜎
𝑃𝑗
1−𝜎 𝑌𝑗 
 
 
Where  𝑛𝑖  also replaces   𝛽𝑖
1−𝜎/𝜎
 in the price index from the Anderson 
and van Wincoop model: 𝑃𝑗 = [∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖)
1−𝜎𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
1/(1−𝜎)
.  
 
Producers 
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The increasing returns to scale element enters the model via the 
assumed cost function 
A2.4 𝑙𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜑𝑦𝑖  
where 𝑙𝑖  is the labor used by the representative firm in country i 
(remember, they are all equal within countries) and 𝑦𝑖 is the firm’s 
output. 𝛼 is the fixed cost and 𝜑𝑖 is the marginal cost. Maximization of 
profits, 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑖, where 𝑤𝑖  is the factor price (the wage) yields 
the following equilibrium conditions (Bergstrand et al. 2013)23. 
 
A2.5  
𝑝𝑖 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
𝜑𝑤𝑖  
 
 
 
A2.6  
𝑦𝑖 =
𝛼
𝜑
(𝜎 − 1)  
Furthermore, assuming full employment assures that the number of 
varieties are determined by the exogenous factor endowment, i.e. the 
labor stock, 𝐿𝑖, which is unique to each country: 
A2.7 𝑛𝑖𝑙𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖    ⇒   𝑛𝑖(𝛼 + 𝜑𝑦𝑖) = 𝐿𝑖    ⟺   𝑛𝑖 =
𝐿𝑖
𝛼𝜎
 
 
The gravity equation 
Following Krugman (1980) and Feenstra (2004) aggregate exports 
from i to j is given by  
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑖𝑗. Inserting the demand function (A2.3), the equilibrium 
number of firms (A2.6) and the equilibrium price (A2.5), Bergstrand et 
al. reach the following gravity equation: 
A2.8 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
(𝑌𝑖/𝐿𝑖)
−𝜎𝜏𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎
∑ 𝑌𝑙(𝑌𝑙/𝐿𝑙)
−𝜎𝜏𝑙𝑗
1−𝜎𝑁
𝑙=1
 
 
Equation (A2.8), subject to the same market clearing condition,  𝑌𝑖 =
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗 , as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is the alternative 
structural gravity equation based on a unconditional general 
equilibrium framework.  
                                                             
23 To save space I do not show the derivation of the consumer or the producer 
problems. They follow the standard derivation of the MC-IR model as in Krugman 
(1980) and Feenstra (2004). 
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The empirical fixed effects version of the model 
Log linearizing equation (A2.8) yields 
A2.9 ln 𝑋𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎)ln 𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗  
Where the country fixed effects terms 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛾𝑗 are given as: 
A2.10 𝛽𝑖 = σln 𝐿𝑖 + (1− 𝜎) ln𝑌𝑖  
A2.11 𝛾𝑗 = ln𝑌𝑗− ln∑ 𝑌𝑙(𝑌𝑙/𝐿𝑙)
−𝜎𝜏𝑙𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑁
𝑙=1
  
and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is a stochastic error term. Note that (A2.9) is the exact same as 
the fixed effects equation (2.17) derived from the Anderson van 
Wincoop model. The only difference lies in the specification of the 
theoretical model and thus how the multilateral resistance terms are 
specified. 
A3 Calculating the trade cost term 
 
Inserting  
Yj
Yw
=
Yi
Yw
= 1/N in (4.8) gives 
A3.1 
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
∗ = ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
−
1
𝑁
∑ ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
+
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
To keep the presentation from getting to messy, I simplify the trade cost 
term in (4.9) and assume that it consists of distance, tariffs and NTBs 
only: 
A3.2 ln𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜌 ln𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗 + 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗  
Now, inserting this expression in equation (A3.1): 
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A3.3 
 
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
∗ = ln(𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗 + 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗 +)
−
1
𝑁
∑ ln(𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜅 ln𝑡𝑗 + 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗)
𝑁
𝑖=1
−
1
𝑁
∑ ln(𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗 + 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=1
+
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln(𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗) 
 
Then, rearranging terms: 
 
This can be written as 
A3.5   ln𝜏𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝜌 ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝜅 ln 𝑡𝑗
∗+ 𝛼 ln𝜔𝑗
∗  
where ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗
∗ , ln 𝑡𝑗
∗ and ln 𝜔𝑗
∗ are given by (4.11) – (4.13). Equation 
(A3.5) is the same as (4.10), only including fewer trade costs proxies 
for illustrative purposes.   
  
A3.4  
 
ln 𝜏𝑖𝑗
∗ =  𝜌 [ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
−
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
+
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
]    
+  𝜅 [ln 𝑡𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln 𝑡𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
−
1
𝑁
∑ ln 𝑡𝑗 +
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln 𝑡𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
]
+  𝛼 [ln𝜔𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝜔𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
−
1
𝑁
∑ ln𝜔𝑗 +
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ ln𝜔𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
] 
Marcus Gjems Theie 80 
A4 Taylor approximations of the cultural and historical 
variables used in the estimations 
The cultural and historical dummy variables used in the 
estimation, Contigij
∗ , Comlangij
∗ , Comcolij
∗ , Colonyij
∗ , Col45ij
∗  and 
Smctryij
∗, are calculated using equation (4.8). Thus, they are defined as 
follows: 
A4.1 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔
𝑖𝑗
∗ =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
A4.2  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗ =
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
A4.3 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
A4.4  
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
A4.5  
𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑙45𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
A4.6  
𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ =  𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
1
𝑁2
∑ ∑ 𝑆𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1   
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A5 List of countries in the dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Algeria 34 Guatemala 67 Pakistan 
2 Argentina 35 Honduras 68 Papua New Guinea 
3 Australia 36 Hong Kong 69 Paraguay 
4 Austria 37 Hungary 70 Peru 
5 Bahrain 38 Iceland 71 Philippines 
6 Bangladesh 39 India 72 Poland 
7 Belarus 40 Indonesia 73 Portugal 
8 Belguim 41 Ireland 74 Republic of Moldova 
9 Bolivia 42 Italy 75 Romania 
10 Brazil 43 Ivory Coast 76 Russian Federation 
11 Brunei 44 Japan 77 Rwanda 
12 Burkina Faso 45 Jordan 78 Saudi Arabia 
13 Butan 46 Kazakstan 79 Senegal 
14 Cameroon 47 Kenya 80 Slovenia 
15 Canada 48 Kygyzstan 81 South Africa 
16 Central African Republic 49 Latvia 82 Spain 
17 Chech Republic 50 Lebanon 83 Sri Lanka 
18 Chile 51 Lithuania 84 Sudan 
19 China 52 Madagascar 85 Sweden 
20 Colombia 53 Malawi 86 Switzerland 
21 Costa Rica 54 Malaysia 87 Tanzania 
22 Country 55 Mali 88 Thailand 
23 Denmark 56 Mauritsius 89 Trinidad And Tobago 
24 Ecuador 57 Mexico 90 Tunisia 
25 EL Salvador 58 Morcocco 91 Turkey 
26 Estonia 59 Mozambique 92 Uganda 
27 Ethiopia 60 Nepal 93 Ukraine 
28 Finland 61 Netherlands 94 United Kingdom 
29 France 62 New Zealand 95 Uruguay 
30 Gabon 63 Nicaragua 96 USA 
31 Germany 64 Nigeria 97 Venezuela 
32 Ghana 65 Norway 98 Vietnam 
33 Greece 66 Oman 99 Zambia 
    100 Zimbabwe 
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